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PREFACE
The purchase of the Tennessee Coal, Iron and
Railroad Company (T.C.I. and R. Co.) by the U.S. Steel
Corporation at the height of Panic of 1907 evoked critic
ism by politicians which historians have subsequently re
iterated.

Some of this criticism was, and has been,

levelled at President Theodore Roosevelt for not objecting
to this merger as a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act.

Elbert Gary, head of the U.S. Steel Corporation, had

asked the President, prior to the purchase, if the govern
ment would take legal action against his company because
of this merger and was assured that it would not.

A large

part of the criticism has focused on the idea that the
Morgan interests used the slump in security prices that
accompanied the Panic to take over a valuable piece of
property.

Thus the U.E. Steel Corporation either created

or intensified its monopolistic control of the American
steel industry.
Most of the contemporary criticism of the Presi
dent's action and the purchase was politically motivated.
Eater authors and historians have accepted most of this
criticism without evaluation of the sources or investiga
tion of the facts.

Further, this purchase did not create

a monopoly, indeed it probably prevented a regional
iii

monopoly from coming into being in the South.

Finally,

the prior approval or disapproval of the executive branch
of the government which was requested for this merger set
a precedent which is present day govei*nment policy.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The years from 1900 to 1907 were ones of almost
uninterrupted economic expansion and prosperity, except
for a sharp but brief setback in 1903.^ Even the farmer
2
had shared in this upsurge.
Despite the good times,
there was considerable public and political condemnation
of the growth of large corporations or trusts, as they
were more frequently called, that had accompanied the
prosperity.

One of the leading critics of the trusts

was President Roosevelt.

Unlike many of the other

critics, however, he did not believe that the trusts were
inherently bad.

In fact, he believed that large scale

business activities were an inevitable economic develop
ment, but that they must be controlled in order to insure
their good conduct.

x

His action against the Northern

Henry David et al. , eds., The Economic History of
The United States, Vol. VII, Harold U. Paulkner, The De
cline of Laissez-Faire (New York: Rinehart & Company, T951),
p. ^2~Thereafter cited as Paulkner, Decline of LaissezFaire).
^Ibid., p. 321.
*The New York Times, July
1902; Theodore Eoosevelt, The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, ed. Herman Hagedorn,
20 volsT^Chii.’ies^cribner's Sons, 37926), X V :43-^5•
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Securities Company, the Beef Trust, and the Standard Oil
Company earned him the title of ”Trust Buster.”

Indeed

these activities against the trusts led William Jennings
Bryan to go as far as accusing the President of plagia
rizing and implementing the "Chicago platform" of the
Democratic Party in 1896 which had called for stricter
regulation of the railroads by the Interstate Commerce
Commission and control of the trusts by the federal
government.

On the other hand, early in 1907 when pros

perity began to fade, many business leaders and journal
ists blamed Roosevelt *s anti-trust activities for the
business recession.
Late in October, 1907, the recession reached the
"panic" stage:

many banks failed, panicked depositors of

apparently solvent banks aggravated conditions by demand
ing their money, and in many parts of the country script
money issued by local banks was replacing the rapidly
disappearing currency. 5 The New York bankers, led by
J. P. Morgan, attempted to prevent further bank failures
by making assets available to financial institutions that

Paolo Coletta, William Jennings Br.yan, Vol. I,
William Jennings Bryan, Political“Evangelist: 1860-1908
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^"Severity of the 1907 Panic," Review of Reviews,
November, 1908, Vol. 38, p. 537*

were pressed by their creditors.

6

When it appeared that the banking and brokerage
firm of Moore and Schley with debts of over $38,000,000
was about to fail, Morgan proposed to Gary that the U.S.
Steel Corporation buy the stock of T.C.I. and R. Co. that
Moore and Schley had used as collateral for a large share
of its loans.

The avowed purpose of this proposal was to

prevent Moore and Schley*s failure by providing it with
credible and liquid assets. 7 Gary reluctantly agreed to
the plan on 3 November, subject to the condition, that
Roosevelt and the government would give assurance that the
U.S. Steel Corporation would not be prosecuted for violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Since Morgan wished to announce the sale prior to
the opening of the New York Stock Exchange on the follow
ing morning, Gary went to Washington in the early morning
o
hours of 4 November to confer with the President.
In
terrupting the President's breakfast, Gary briefly out
lined the problem without mentioning the name of the firm

Frederick Lewis Allen, The Great Pierpont Morgan
(New York: Harper & Brothers,
?!T.S. Congress, House, Special Committee to In
vestigate Whether U.S. Steel Corporation or other ^Corporat£onsnava"Tiolated Antitrust ^ScF^FF^TS^nT^^B^nH’^ongTT
Pd sess., p. 107 (hereafter cited as Stanley Hearings;.
8It>id., pp. 1605, 1606.

that was in danger of failing.

He-,said that the

threatened company possessed a majority of the T.C.I. and
R. Co. stock, and that under ordinary conditions, his
corporation would be reluctant to buy the T.C.I. and R.
Co. since it would raise their control of the steel industry by 4 or 5 per cent.

9

Nevertheless, it would not

raise the corporation's total control of the industry to
above the 60 per cent limit that the U.S. Steel Corpora
tion had established for itself.
Because the Attorney-General was not in the
capital, Roosevelt called Secretary of State

Elihu Root,

an experienced corporation lawyer whom the President
considered highly competent on trust problems, to advise
11
him on the subject."
Since Root could find no legal
barriers to the acquisition, Roosevelt said that although
he could not approve it, he would interpose no objections. 12

The sale was immediately announced to the

press. 13

9Ibid., pp. 1122, 1379-

10Ibld., p. 1122.

U.S. Congress, House, Special Committee to Investigate Whether the United States Steel* Corporation or
UtEerCorporatTons or (TtTEer'"Persons ^ToTaTeH'uHe^jrET^'
Trust Act of 1890 v House Report Il^7T~"6'2nd CongT, 2d sess.
tart m i p” 5”5^hereafter cited as Stanley Report—
Minority).
“ ~
^ Stanley Hearings, p . 1122.
^ The New York Times, November

1907> p. 1-

5
The firm of Moore and Schley did not fail.

Within

a few days after this event, it was apparent that the depth
of the Panic had passed; within days, magazine stories were
referring to the Panic in the past tense.

Many of these
14
stories hailed Morgan as the savior of the situation.

Roosevelt*s anti-business attitude was featured in many
15
others as the cause of the Panic.
Significantly, in view
of later developments, no adverse comments can be found re
garding the U.S. Steel Corporation’s acquisition of the
T.C.I. and R. Co. except in William Jennings Bryan*s weekly
newspaper Commoner, which was published in Lincoln, Nebras
ka.

Speaking editorially on 22 November 1907? the paper

said that the merger of these two corporations was another
link in the chain of monopoly and that only time would tell
what effect it would have on the public interests of the
South. ^
The issue lay dormant until the Presidential cam
paign of 1908.

The Democratic nominee, William Jennings

Bryan, limited his remarks about the U.S. Steel Corporation
to a typical campaign charge that the Steel Trust had pur
chased immunity from prosecution under the Sherman AntiTrust Act by contributing to the Republican campaign fund.

^"Mr. Morgan, The Man of the Hour,” Literary
Digest, November 9, 1907, Vol. 37> P« 676.
15Xbid., p. 669.
^Commoner, November 22, 190?, p. 6.
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6
Then William Randolph Hearst, the Independent Party candi
date for President, made the sensational charge that
Charles N. Haskell, the Governor of Oklahoma and Treasurer
of the Democratic Party, was and had been an agent of the
Standard Oil Company for some time.

When Bryan rose to

Haskell's defense and pointed to the lack of evidence,
Roosevelt quickly corroborated Hearst's charges by pro
ducing evidence from the government's case against Standard
Oil that was in adjudication at that time. 17(
Hearst next produced court records to show that
Haskell had acted as an agent in the organization of the
U.S. Steel Corporation, receiving a fee of $50>000 for
handling the transfer of ore lands and stock between com
panies.

The record stipulated that the fee represented 1
per cent of the transaction. 18 On the day after Hearst
made this disclosure, Bryan charged that Roosevelt had al
lowed the Steel Trust to buy one of its largest rivals and
19
obtain 50 per cent of the market.
It is noteworthy that
neither in these, nor in later remarks about the merger,
did Bryan refer to the T.C.I. and R. Co. by name.
Yet no doubt was to be left in the reading public's
mind about the identity of the companies involved.
^^Omaha Bee, September 24, 1907* p. 2.
18Ibid., September 25, 1907, p. 2.
~*~^Ibld., September 27, 1907, p. 2.

Within

7
48 hours after Bryan made his charge, Roosevelt revealed
his role in the affair, specifying the time, the people
involved, and the necessity for this transaction as it
was presented to him by Gary. 20
The issue was then dropped only to reappear when
Congress reconvened after the election of 1908.

At that

time the Chairman of the Democratic caucus, Senator Charles
Culberson, introduced a resolution that requested the
Attorney-General to inform the Senate if the government
was suing the U.S. Steel Corporation under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act because of its absorption of the T.C.I. and
21
R. Co.
When the Attorney-General replied that no action
was being taken by the Justice Department, Culberson
countered with a resolution to investigate the absorption
of T.C.I. and R. Co. by the U.S. Steel Corporation.

Cul

berson’s resolution was passed unanimously by the Repub
lican controlled Senate which, like Roosevelt, showed no
reticence about having this affair exposed to public
20Theodore Roosevelt, The Letters of Theodore
Roosevelt, ed. Elting Morison,*~3ohiT3lum7~anT^Uohn~Buckley,
B~vols. (Cambridge, Hass.: Harvard University Press, 19511954-)
R* to W. J. Bryan, September 27, 1908, VI:1259.
21

U.S. Congress, Senate, Inquiry to the Attorney
General Asking Whether Suit was Instituted~Undexr Sherman
Act Against United Stat¥sTteeTc^rporatTonAor "Absorption
of Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad. Company, S . Res.
9 0 9 , 60th Cong., 2d sess.
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scrutiny.^
The investigation was completed in less than 60
days.

Roosevelt refused to give the committee any informa

tion that the government had about the Steel Corporation,
except for the correspondence dealing with the government’s
23
part in the acquisition of the T.C.I. and R. Co. ^ Very
few witnesses were called by this investigating committee
and the conclusions drawn by the Committee were divided
along party lines.

The report of the Democratic members of

the committee contained the principal charges that have
been made in connection with this merger.

Briefly these

allegations were that the purchase constituted a violation
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; that the' President was not
authorized to permit the absorption; that the property was
worth several hundred million dollars; and ". . . that
among the larger benefits which the Steel Corporation de
rives from the merger are the control of the open-hearth
production of steel rails, the ultimate control of the
iron ore of the country, a practical monopoly of the iron
and steel trade of the South and the elimination of a
22 U.S. Congress, Senate, Investigation of the
Absorption of Tennessee Coal, Iron and RaTl.road Company
by the United States Steel Corporation, S. Re*sT~2h3, 60th
Cong., 2d sess.
^ Outlook, January 16, 1909, Vol. 91, p* 88.

9
24strong and growing competition,”

The committee made no

legislative recommendations and, aside from the publicity
it received due to Roosevelt's refusal to provide it with
information, it attracted little attention.
Again the issue disappeared from public view until
the Democrats gained control of the House of Representa
tives in the elections of 1910.

On 16 May 1911 the House

passed a resolution which authorized a sub-committee of
the Judiciary Committee to investigate the Steel Trust.
This group, generally called the Stanley Committee after
its Chairman, Democratic Congressman Augustus 0. Stanley
of Kentucky, commenced in June, 1911, work that was only
completed in August, 1912. Unlike the Senate Committee
which had investigated the absorption of the T.C.I. and R.
Co., the Stanley Committee attracted much publicity.

With

the exception of J. P. Morgan, every important figure in
25
the steel industry testified.
A large part of the evi
dence collected dealt with details of the purchase of the
T.C.I. and R. Co.

Theodore Roosevelt's appearance as a

volunteer witness in August, 1911, was the high point of
the hearing.
24-U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Judiciary,
Absorption of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. by the
Xlnited States Steel CorporationTTearing before a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, Senate Doc. 44-,
62nd Cong., 1st sess. (hereafter, cited as Absorption by
The United States Steel Corporation).
fri-irr- ~rt rrwi ■■ in m h— iiihim him i»i»i n ran i im n ~i ii'> ■in i n _ in in 'in— i—

~i irr ir— ■ m u ■ rnir in r i P''mi'i n

.. #

.

^^The New York Times, August 3, 1912, p. 2.

.

10

When the committee published its findings a year
later, the Democratic majority condemned Roosevelt for
failure to interfere with the merger, stating that the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act did not give the President the
authority to refuse to take action in such cases.

Fur

ther, the majority report stated that although the posi
tion of the U.S. Steel Corporation was once due to busi
ness acumen, ”. . . the [present] dominance of the Steel
Corporation . . .

is due to the sudden, ill-considered and

arbitrary fiat of the executive.”

The minority report,

predictably, supported former President Roosevelt’s
action. 271
While the Stanley Committee was-sitting, two
other events took place.

On 1 July 1911 the Commissioner

of Corporations issued an exhaustive report on the steel
industry that had been in preparation for over five years.
The most important conclusion of this report stated ”. . .
it is apparent that the United States Steel Corporation
does not have a monopoly in the production of iron and
26U.S. Congress, Special Committee'to Investigate
Whether United States S t e e r ^ o r p o r ^ ToiT'o^r OtlTe^^TToroorations or Persons Viol ated"'the "Ant i-TrruPt"AcP""of"^1690 > H.
Rept 1 1.P7 > 61Pnd~Tfoiigd ses'sTP Part I, p ,~~20Y'"{Hereaft'er
cited as Stanley Report--Majority).
27

Stanley Report--Minority, p . 93»

11

28
steel.”

This statement was qualified by the remark that

". . . the Steel Corporation does occupy a position in the
iron-ore industry, which while by no means constituting a
monopoly, is clearly indicative of monopolistic influence."
Further, the report said, "The acquisition of the Tennessee
Coal, Iron and Railroad Company likewise was apparently
desirable more on account of the enormous ore resources of
the company than because of its manufacturing plants. . ."

29

The publication of this report caused no tremors,
one paper pointing out its uncontroversial nature by.noting
that its issuance was immediately followed by a rise in the
price of U.S. Steel Corporation common stock.

However,

the report was the only comprehensive statistical picture
of the U.S. Steel Corporation in the first decade of its
existence.
Less than four months after the Bureau of Corpora
tions Report was issued, the Department of Justice brought
suit against U.S. Steel Corporation for violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.

Among the several causes for the

28
U.S., Department of Commerce, Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the Steel Industry, July 1,
T^lT^^X^ashington, D.C.: Government^Printing Office, 1911),
Part I. p. 37? (hereafter cited as Bureau of Corporations
Report).

w

m

m

rm n>

29Ibid.
30
y U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Corpora
tions, Investigation of the United States Steel Corpora
tion, 1903-1911, p- 16, Pile !D067~Kg l3?~National
Archives, Washington, D. C. (hereafter cited as Bureau of
Corporations Steel Investigation).

12

action listed in the government's brief, was the acquisi
tion of the T.C.I. and R. Co.

Charging that Roosevelt had

been misled by Gary, the brief stated that 11. . . nothing
less than control of the Tennessee Company was considered
by the Steel Corporation,” and that

. . there was a

desire to assume control of a company and purpose to ac
quire control of a company that had recently assumed a
position of potential competition of great significance.”
Adding specifications to these intentions, the brief said
that the U.S. Steel Corporation had by this merger acquired
4-00,000,000 tons of iron ore which greatly strengthened its
control of the iron ore supply of the country and that it
had assumed a predominant position in the iron and steel
trade of the South.^
The suit against the U.S. Steel Corporation had
immediate political repercussions.

Roosevelt not only

vehemently denied that he had been misled by Gary, but used
this denial as a springboard for an attack on the anti
trust policies of his chosen successor, President William
Howard Taft.

Roosevelt described Taft’s indiscriminate

attacks 'on the trusts as being as outmoded as the flint
locks of Washington’s army, saying that, "The effort to
prohibit all combinations, bad or good, is bound to fail,
and ought to fail."

At the same time he reiterated the

^ The New York Times, October 27, 1911, p. 1.

13
demands that he had made as President for the regulation
of the trusts.-^

Many leaders of the Republican Party,

dissatisfied with Taft, turned to Roosevelt for leader
ship, and his bolt to Bull-Moose Progressivism helped a
divided party to go down in defeat in the Presidential
election of 1912.
Although the Democratic candidate, Woodrow Wilson,
attacked the Steel Trust during the campaign, he made no
allusion to the purchase of the T.C.I. and R. Co.

How

ever, Bryan, in a book published during the campaign, al
luded to the purchase, stating that "Roosevelt allowed the
Steel Corporation to swallow its largest rival®

Ho

record can be found of any answer to this charge, and the
purchase of the T.C.I. and R. Co. by the U.S. Steel
Corporation died as a political issue in the campaign of

1912.
After nine years in the federal courts, the Supreme
Court in 1920 dismissed the governments complaint against
the U.S. Steel Corporation on all counts.

Although this

legally buried the charge that the corporation had viola
ted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and that Roosevelt had

^Theodore Roosevelt, "The Trusts, the People, and
the Square Deal," Outlook, November 18, 1911, Vol. 99,
pp. 649-656.
^William Jennings Bryan, A Tale of Two Conven
tions, ed. Virgil V. McNitt (New YorkT'Tunk^nd’
lTagnalls,

p. 306.

14
■been a party to the violation, it has not prevented’the
periodic revival of criticism by authors such as Matthew
Josephson, Gabriel Kolko, and Ferdinand Lundberg.
Most of the critics have attacked the principals
in this affair for using what today might be called sharp
business practices, using much of the same evidence that
the Senate investigation of the absorption of the T.C.I*
and R. Co. and the Stanley Committee gathered and that the
government set forth in its unsuccessful suit.

Most of

these critics, by presenting only fragments of the evi
dence, have failed to present a coherent picture of this
merger and the events that led up to it.

Likewise, most

of them have failed to analyze the motives of the Con
gressional groups that conducted these investigations and
the motives of the Taft Administration in not bringing
this suit until the fall of 1911.

Unfortunately, the

Supreme Court decision of 1920, because it dealt mostly
with the legal aspects of monopoly, shed no light on these
aspects of this case.

^ Matthew Josephson, The President Makers: The
Culture of Politics and LeadeFslTI^~3n~~An~^^aMof'^hrir<htenman¥^1896-d9l^lNew York: Harcourt Brace and Company>
1940JT PP« 2 5 3 -5 5 ; Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American hnatopy~T9001916
T r e s F ^ T GlencToe?^T963T7np*~”Y14;
Ferdinand Lundberg, America’s 60 Families (New York:
Vanguard Press, 19377TTF*~”9l^2.

CHAPTER II
JOHN W. GATES AND THE SYNDICATE
The chain of events that led to the acquisition
of the T.C.I. and R. Co. by the U.S. Steel Corporation
actually began in the 1890's when capitalists put together
the various medium sized combinations that, following a
subsequent consolidation, became the U.S. Steel Corpora
tion.

In many ways it is the story of two tycoons:

John W. Gates,

one,

whose name has been rarely connected with

the acquisition of the southern iron and steel company,
and the other, J. P. Morgan, who has been accused directly
and indirectly of using or causing the Panic of 1907 to
2
promote this acquisition.
Gates, like the better known Charles Schwab and
Andrew Carnegie, was one of the principal figures in the
huilding of a large scale American steel industry.

His

company, the American Steel and V/ire Company, legally

^Xda M. Tarbell, The Life of Elbert Gary: A Story
in Steel (New York: D. Appleton "U^iFury^ompai^V^^^TT^
p. f98~Xhereafter cited as Tarbell, Gary). Tarbell. merely
mentions that Gates was a member of the pool that owned
the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Raili*oad Company.

16
monopolized the barbed wire production of the United States
*
simply by owning all the patents for its manufacture.
By
his ora admission* Gates made full use of this monopoly to
advance the price of barbed wire.

Zl

The output of his

company was by no means limited to barbed wire; it, like
most steel companies, turned out a variety of finished and
unfinished iron and steel products.

Accordingly the

American Steel and Wire Company both shared in the general
prosperity of the steel business immediately prior to the
turn of the century and was constantly threatened by the
cutthroat competition characteristic of this industry.
For Gates,

or for any large steel manufacturer,

the two most important competitors were J, P, Morgan and
Andrew Carnegie, each of whom controlled large steel cor
porations.

Morgan, because of his financial resources,

was well equipped to weather a long siege of stiff, price
cutting competition, yet Morgan.had already established a
reputation for not initiating such competition and for
trying to prevent it.

Carnegie, unlike Morgan, was a

combative competitor, who easily made up what he lacked
in financial resources by being an increasingly efficient

^Paulkner, Decline of Laissez Faire, p. 159.
^Ibid.
^Frederick Lewis Allen, The Great Pierpont Morgan
(New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, l9^"9J7" P* 1727*

17
steel maker.

He threatened to move into other steel

manufacturers' fields, threatened to build a fleet of ore
boats to assure his source of raw materials, and even
threatened to build a railroad parallel to the Pennsyl
vania Railroad, which itself controlled a steel company.
Despite these tactics, Carnegie wished to retire
and much of his aggressiveness was directed toward forcing
his harassed competitors to buy him out.

When the Rocke

fellers attempted to form a combination of the larger steel
companies to purchase Carnegie's interests, they were
forced to abandon the project because they could not mobi
lize the capital needed for such a large operation.

Shortly

after this independent steel manufacturers, harassed by
Carnegie's competition and also wishing to enjoy the bene
fits of large scale specialized steel manufacturing, ap
pealed to Morgan to form a combination that would buy
Carnegie out.

Morgan, sensing that stock market condi

tions were ripe for the flotation of the huge amount of
*

securities necessary for such an undertaking, agreed to
form the combination, and in 1901 the U.S. Steel Corpora
tion, the first corporation to be capitalized at over one
billion dollars, was founded.
The foundation was not without birth pains.
who had been the one of the architects of the new

Gates

corporation6 found that his, services were no longer de
sired by Morgan once the huge corporation had been organ
ized.

His buccaneer methods, which were well known to

Wall Street insiders, such as selling stock in his own
companies short and then reaping a stock profit when he
unexpectedly shut down his plants, were repugnant to
n

Morgan’s rigid sense of business propriety. r
Consequently Gates had no part in the management
of the new corporation.

His lingering bitterness came

out during the Stanley Committee Hearings when he testi
fied that he would be ashamed to admit to the small
financial remuneration he had received as one of its
organizers.^
Although Morgan and Gates had no personal contacts
after 1901, their business relationship was far from over.
Gates not only continued to expand his holdings in the
iron and steel industry, but moved into the railroad busi
ness in a series of predatory stock market operations that
gained control of small but key railroads which could be
used to harass the major operating systems.

His most

sensational attack was on the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad, a line that was thought to be safely in the

;— Minority, p. 7*
^The New York Times, May 30, 1911, p. 2.
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control of August Belmont.

Gates created a corner in the

stock of this railroad in April, 1902, causing a minor
panic when he threatened to make the speculators who had
q
sold its stock short deliver their shares.y The Belmont in
terests appealed to Morgan, who by now had become the arbi
ter of the American financial community, to restore the
railroad to their management.^
Morgan sent George Perkins, his senior partner,
to deal with Gates.

After around the clock negotiations

Gates surrendered his interests in the Louisville and
Nashville for 43,860,000 dollars.^

Perkins observed that

Gates had a taste of blood and that he would be heard from
. 12
again.
Morgan expressed his view of the Louisville and
Nashville affair and Gates' character when he testified
before the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1903 that
Gates was only interested in the transaction and not in
the transportation needs of the South when he acquired the
railroad.^

As Perkins predicted, Gates was heard from

^The Neiv York Times, May 30, 1911» p. 2.
John A. Garraty, Right-Hand Man: The L ife of
George W. Perkins (New York: Harper & Brothers,”Tub*lTshers,
T93'7T7np^*^^'~^^reafte3? cited as Garraty, Right-Hand Man).
^ Ibid., p. 153.

^ Ibid., p. 152 .

■tTohn Moody and George Kibbe Turner, ’’Masters of
Capital in America,” McClure's Magazine, January, 1911,
Vol. 36, p. 34-6.
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again.

When Gates acquired the Cincinnati, Hamilton and

Dayton Railroad, a key connecting line in southern Ohio,
Morgan again bought Gates out. 14
Nevertheless, the extent of Gates' excursions
into the railroad business was limited since nearly all
of the roads had been incorporated into large rail systems
that were safely in the hands of financiers who.were more
than capable of defending themselves against stock market
operators.

However, Gates' acquisition of railroads merely

to earn a quick profit intensified the distrust that
Morgan already held for him."^
By 1905 newspaper stories made it apparent that
Gates planned to expand his interests in the steel and iron
business.

Already in possession of the Republic Steel

Company xvhich owned properties in both the Lake district of
upper Michigan and Minnesota and in the Birmingham district
of Alabama, the reports said that Gates planned to form a
combination, using the T.C.I. and R. Co. as a nucleus, that
would control the southern output of pig iron and prac
tically all the finished iron and steel made in that section.

Although Gates' reasons for making the T.C.I. and
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15Ibid., May 29, 1911, p. 1.
^ I b i d . , February 22, 1905, p- 14-; April 1, 1905,
p. 15; Bureau of Corporations Steel Investigation Rile
2612-1-3=2:
"
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R. Co, the key company in the proposed combination remained
unknown even after investigations by the Bureau of Corpora
tions and both houses of Congress, the most likely reasons
were that the company's control of a large share of
Birmingham district's iron ore reserves would assure a
source of raw materials and at the same time make a good
advertising point for the marketing of the company's secu
rities.
In the beginning Gates' part in the attempted com
bination was not generally known, but by April, 1905, his
role was correctly described in the press. 17 Actually the
maneuvering to effect the consolidation began in February,
18
1904, with a flurry of published rumors.
Substance was
added to the rumors when the syndicate bought the T.C.I.
^
19
and R. Co. in February, 1905,
and then used this cor
poration to buy the Birmingham and Southern Railroad, an
ore road that serviced the entire Birmingham mining
district and as a terminal railroad connected the trunk
20
lines that served Birmingham.
At the same time the new
management of the T.C.I. and R. Co., which was largely
^ The New York Times, April 1, 1905, p. 15^ I b i d ., February 22, 1904, p. 14.
20

~^ I b i d .

Ethel Armes, The Story of Coal and Iron in Ala
bama(Cambridge, Mass. : The fiarvard University !Press, 1910),
p. 514(hereafter cited as Armes, Coal
and Iron); The New
York Times, July 5, 1906, p. 10.
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comprised of the officers of Gates* Republic Steel
Company began by increments to increase the corporation’s
21
capitalization by the issuance of common stock.
Al
though these issues were publicly advertised they were
sold for the most part only to the syndicate that had
purchased the T.C.I. and R. Co.
What the true intentions of Gates and the syndi
cate were may never be learned but the conditions that
prompted them to attempt to combine the iron and steel
companies of the Birmingham district were a result of tech
nical developments and business conditions that appeared to
favor the amalgamation of a large steel company in the
South.
Prior to the general conversion from the production
of Bessemer steel to the manufacture of open-hearth steel
which began in the 1890's, the Birmingham district was not
thought of as a steel manufacturing area since the dis
trict's ores contained too much phosphorous for the
Bessemer process. 22 However the non-Bessemer ores of the
district were suitable for producing open-hearth steel by
the duplex process.

Nevertheless a disadvantage still

21 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, September 22,
p. 704-; Februar3r~27~™T9Q7T P* "^75; October T?, 1907 1 p. 923*
22Rupert B. Vance, Human Geography of the South: A
Study in Regional Resources and Human Adequacy (Chapel in 11,
North Carolina: The University of” North Carolina Press,
1932), p. 302 (hereafter cited as Vance,
*
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existed since the duplex process, as the name suggests,
required a double manufacturing cycle by which the ore was
converted in scrap metal and then re~manufactured into
open-hearth steel. 23
^ Also a comparative economic disad
vantage existed with the more industrialized sections of
the country in the manufacture of steel since in these
areas large quantities of obsolescent and discarded
finished iron and steel products were returned to the
mills as relatively cheap raw material for the open-hearth
24process.
At the same time the suitability of scrap
material to the open-hearth process in place of the pig
iron which was a necessity of the Bessemer process and
which was also the principal product of the Birmingham
district, relatively decreased the dependence of the north
ern steel makers on this district as a source of raw
materials. 25
y The greatest disadvantage for the Birmingham
district was that no local markets existed and transporta
tion costs prevented Birmingham from being a true competitor in the northern markets.

25Ibid. , p. 5 05 .

In fact the Birmingham

2h b i d .. p. 306.

25
^Richard Hartshorne, "The Iron and Steel Industry
of the United States," Journal of Geography,.Aprilv 1929,
Vol. XXVIII, p. 137 (hereafter cited aiHartshorne, "Iron
and St ee1 Indus try").
26Ibid.
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district was not destined to rival Gary or Pittsburgh as a
27
steel producing center because of the market factors. '
The questionable technical advantage and inherent
economic disadvantages were offset by extraordinarily
prosperous business conditions and a seemingly insatiable
demand for steel.

In 1905 steel production had increased
28
by 100 per cent over the figure for 1900
encouraging ex
pansion of steel production facilities.

At the same time

there was a general rise in the price of securities.

This

condition particularly suited Gates' method of operation.
Always a bull in the stock market, Gates had used rising
stock prices to manipulate a financial maneuver that might
be Galled a stock flotation-option device to finance his
previous successful combinations.
As described in testimony in an equity suit in
1 9 0 2 , ^ and by his secretary twenty years later,^ the
operation was uncomplicated as long as the prices of secu
rities were rising or could be made to rise.

The

27Ibid., p. 150 .
28

Arthur P. Burns, Production Trends in the United
States Since 1870 (New York: National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1934), Table 44, p. 296.
^ T h e New York Times, March 18, 1902, p. 9;
March 19, 1902, p . ?.
» 0 . A. Owens, "Bet You A Million Gates,” Saturday
Evening Post,. November 7, 1925, Vol. 198, p. 225.
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syndicate or pool bought control of a corporation which
functioned as a seed capital source to finance the pro
posed combination.

New issues of common and preferred

stocks were issued by the corporation and bought by the
syndicate at inflated prices which caused the stock to be
quoted at above its actual value on the stock market.

At

the same time both the new stock and the old stock were
used as collateral

for margin loans with which to pay for

new issues of stock and to take options to buy the stock
of the companies that were to be included in the new
combination when the price of the stock of these companies
had risen to the value that had been agreed upon in the
option.

The natural upswing in bull market prices coupled

with the rumors of the impending consolidation

should then

have caused a rise

companies

in the stock value of these

and enabled the syndicate to effect the combination by
executing its options.

The inflated stock of the corpora

tion that had financed the operation was then exchanged
for the stock of the companies to be acquired.

Although

this plan was followed in attempting to combine the south
ern iron and steel companies, it failed of execution.
The Gates syndicate had purchased a larger part,
if not all, of the new issues of the T.C.I. and R. Co.
common s t o c k31
. G r a n t B. Schley, the senior partner in

^Stanley- Report--Majority, p . 190.
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the New York brokerage firm of Moore and Schley was the
financial manager of the syndicate.

In the syndicate

agreement the poi^ers given to Schley provide an insight
into the intentions of the syndicate and also into its
problems.

Schley was empowered to sell the syndicate's

stock, but only at a profit, indicating a speculative in32
tent.
He could pledge the stock as collateral for
33 His testimony showed that he secured 35*000,000
loans.^
dollars in loans with the T.C.I. and R. Co. common
34.
stock.
However the par valuation of the total common
stock issued was only 32,900,000 dollars.^

When a

general decline in stock prices in 1907 caused Schley's
creditors to demand that he substitute a more reliable
collateral than the T.C.I. and R. Co. common stock, and
when he failed to meet these demands, the device by which
Gates put together his previous combinations collapsed.
Two reasons account for the syndicate's failure
to combine the southern iron and steel companies.

The

first was Gates' unsavory reputation with the financial
community and the investing public.

In the syndicate's

two and a half years of operation prior to the Panic of
32Stanley Report— Minority, p. 51*
55Ibid.
^\fal.l Street Journal, August 3, 1911, P* 3*
^ The New York Times, June 2, 1911, p. 3*
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1907, Gates* well known but never publicly acknowledged
role, undoubtedly caused investors to shy away from the
companies which the syndicate intended to combine.

Writ

ing many years later, his secretary noted that Gates’ name
had acquired a taint that made him reprehensible to the
responsible members of the financial community.
Nor was Gates' disrepute limited to the business
world.

His published testimony in 1902 regarding the

organization of the American and Steel Wire Company re
vealed that he could not remember what happened to
26,000,000 dollars worth of the corporation's stock that
disappeared. 37 Newspaper articles about his activities
bore derogatory headlines such as ''Gates Seizes TCI Fast138
or "Kansas Southern Taken From Harriman*

39

Likewise his

well publicized, profligate gambling habits, involving in
one instance in 1905 the loss of 50,000 dollars in a single
bet, brought his name from the financial pages to the front
p a g e ^ under less than desirable conditions for a man whose

360. A. Owens, "Bet You A Million Gates," Saturday
Evening Post, November 7, 1925, Vol. 198, p. 225.
^ The New York Times, March 19, 1902,

p. 7*

^ Ibid. , February 22, 1905, p. 14-.
59Ibid., May 11, 1905, p. 11.
^ Ibid., October 1, 1905, p. 1; November
P. 11.

3, 1905,
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success as an industrial organizer would ultimately depend
on the confidence of the investing public.
The taint which Gates' secretary spoke of had
apparently spread well beyond the financial community by
the spring of 1907*

On 23 May Gates publicly announced

that he was withdrawing from active participation in the
syndicate, but that he was not selling out his interest. 4-1
Gates left New York complaining bitterly about the "green
bugs of V/all St.“ who were responsible for the depressed
security prices. 42
Actually, the withdrawal did not alter Gates'
legal relationship with the syndicate, nor did Gates re
linquish his managerial positions in the T.C.I. and R.
Co. or the Republic Steel Company.

Prior to Gates’ state

ment, the syndicate had announced that it would continue
to operate despite Gates' withdrawal. 43^ Neither contem
porary accounts in the press nor subsequent investigations
by Congressional committees of the events leading to the
acquisition of the T.C.I. and R. Co. attempted to account
for Gates' abrupt but well advertised withdrawal.

Since

he did not sever his business relations with the syndicate

^ Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1907, p* 2.
^2Ibid.
^Commercial and Financial Chronicle, May 4, 1907,
p. 1037.
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or the steel companies, his withdrawal was more an
announcement than an actuality, and in the absence of
other evidence, it seems reasonable to assume that it was
a public relations ploy.

If it was a ploy, it came too

late, for by the spring of 1907 a second and more over
riding reason for the failure of the syndicate to combine
southern companies had developed.
The worldwide economic prosperity showed signs in
early 1907 of faltering.

Financial panics in other coun

tries preceded the panic which the United States■experi
enced in late October and early November.

A basic cause

of the financial problem in the United States was that the
price of stocks relative to interest rate for money was
too high.

Consequently knowledgeable investors trans

ferred their holdings from stocks to real estate or other
less liquid forms of capital. 44 Concurrently the interest
rates on bonds steadily rose in 1 9 0 7 * further diverting
money from the stock market. 45
x The situation of the T.C.I.
and R. Co. common stock was particularly disadvantageous.
As the average yield on corporate and municipal bonds rose
to 4.21% in 1 9 0 7 an article in the V/all Street Journal

^Faulkner, Decline of Laissez Faire, p. 29.
^ S i d n e y Homer, A History of Interest Rates (New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers*^UnTvers3TtynPre^¥7^963),
Table .5 1? p. 364.
46Ibid., Table 45, p. 341.

$0
showed that the yield on T.C.I, and R. common stock was
only 2.6%. (

An article in the same paper only ten days

previous noted that the T.C.I. and R. Co. had the lowest
balance of earnings (4.2%) available for dividends of
4B
any iron and steel company in the United States.
In
contrast, the U.S. Steel Corporation had a high of

27.2%.49
The Bureau of Corporations Report on the steel
industry noted that one of the most important factors in
bringing a combination together was a favorable stock mar50
ket situation.
By the spring of 1907 this condition did
not exist.

A sharp break in security prices in March, the
51
so-called "Silent Panic of 1907,’
signalled accurately

that the business cycle had reached its peak and was
headed downward to the trough. 52 At this point the syndi
cate was unable to completely absorb the newest issue of
T.C.I. and R. Co. stock which was payable in monthly

^ W a l l Street Journal, May 30, 1907, p. 8.
48Ibid., May 20, 1907, p. 1.

49Ibid.

50 Bureau of Corporations Report, Part I, p. 6.
^ The New York Times, May 30, 1911, p. 2.
52
Their Periodical Occurrence in the'""UfnTtea^tat-es, trans.
and ed. by DeCourcy W. Thom C3rd~ed.; New York: Augustus M.
Kelly, Publishers, 1966), pp. 164-63.
y Clement Juglar, A Brief History of Panics and
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installments." ^
Nevertheless the syndicate attempted to convince
the investing public that the T.C.I. and R. Co. had greatpotential.

At approximately the time Gates withdrew from

the syndicate, newspaper articles appeared commenting for
the first time on the colossal iron ore reserves of the
T.C.I. and R. Co. 54 In one article, a member of the syndicate estimated the ore reserves at one billion tons. 55
While these stories apparently had little effect in pro
moting the combination, they were significant since the
T.C.I. and R. Co. annual financial statement made no mention of these resources, 56 while on the other hand these
figures bear a striking similarity to the exaggerated
estimates that were introduced as evidence of T.C.I. and
R. Co.’s mineral resources by the Majority Report of the
57
Stanley Committee. '
All hope that the syndicate could combine the
southern iron and steel companies evaporated when the
security prices collapsed in March and continued to

-^Commercial and Financial Chronicle, November 30,
1907, p. 14077“
^ W a l l Street Journal, April 2, 1907, p. 1 and
May 10, 1937, p T 7 .
55Ibid., May 10, 1907, p. 7Commercial and Financial Chronicle, April 27,
1907, p. 993.
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decline.^
workable.

Gates1 bull market strategem was no longer
The firm corner which the syndicate had in the

T.C.I. and R. Co. stock became a trap when the hard
pressed banks required that Schley substitute a more cred59
ible collateral for his loans. '
As the general economic conditions worsened,
Schley and the syndicate’s situation worsened.

One of

Schley’s creditors sensed a way out of the dilemma in the
spring when he let Morgan know that the T.C.I. and R. Co.
stock was available for sale, but Morgan was unable to
find a b u y e r . ^

In the latter part of October when the

Panic of 1907 threatened the entire financial community,
Schley and his brokerage firm faced bankruptcy v/hen the
’
61
i
banks began to call his loans.
At this point Schley,
at the urging of another of his creditors, approached
Morgan through an intermediary and within a week the
financier arranged its sale to the reluctant management
of the U.S. Steel Corporation.

Amid the welter of

financial nev/s concerning the Panic, the sale caused lit
tle fanfare and did not become a political matter until
the election of 1908.

^ T h e New York Times, May 30, 1911* P- 2.
^Commercial and Financial Chronicle, June 10,
1911, p. 1529.
^ Stanley Hearings, p. 15.
^ Ibid. , p. 1054.
6?
Corey, House of Morgan, p. 346; Wall Street
Journal, August 3, 19X1, p. 3*

CHAPTER III
t

THE T.C.I. AND R. CO. ACQUISITION
FROM A LEGAL STANDPOINT
Two principal allegations were the basis for the
attacks on the merger of the two companies.

The first was

that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act had been violated by the
intent or conspiracy on the part of the Morgan interests
and the U.S. Steel Corporation to gain control of the
T.C.I. and R. Co.

The second allegation was that the

merger had the effect of creating a condition that the
Sherman Act was designed to prevent.
The Majority Report of the Stanley Committee
claimed that the Morgan interests and the U.S. Steel Cor
poration had aggravated and exploited the Panic of 1907
to gain control of the T.C.I. and R. Co.

To support

this claim, the Majority made the politically sensational
allegation that Gary had duped Roosevelt when he told the
President that a large New York concern which faced bank
ruptcy had among its assets a majority of the T.C.I. and
R. Co. stock and that this concern had asked the U.S.
Steel Corporation to buy this stock.'1'

34The evidence which supported these charges was
principally gathered by the Senate Committee which made
a perfunctory investigation of the absorption of the
T.C.I. and R. Co. and the Stanley Committee.

Although

later writers commenting on this case have relied on the
Stanley Report and the Stanley Hearings for source mater
ial, the evidence in both of these sources is incomplete.
Neither Morgan, nor George Kessler who was a link between
Morgan and the syndicate, were called as witnesses, al
though the minority members of the Committee requested
their presence.^

Another defect in these sources is that

the members of the Stanley Committee, both majority and
minority, either through lack of professional legal com
petence or because of unaccountable ulterior motives,
failed to thoroughly question witnesses or confront wit
nesses xtfith obvious inconsistencies and gaps in their
testimony.
To examine the basis of the charge that Morgan
and the U.S. Steel Corporation intended or conspired to
take over the T.C.I. and R. Co., and by an adroit decep
tion used the Panic of 1907 to accomplish this end, the
evidence presented to the Stanley Committee and the
events as they occurred in 1907 must be recounted in more
detail.

Some time in the spring of 1907 (the date was

not specified in the evidence), George Kessler, an

-
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erstwhile member of the Gates syndicate and creditor of
Schley, told Morgan that the syndicate was willing to sell
out.

Both Gary’s and Gates* testimony agreed on this

point.

Morgan relayed the offer to Gary v/ho rejected it.Gary also testified that representatives of the

syndicate had approached him several times in 1907 prior
to the Panic with offers to sell, but that he had refused
them.^

Nevertheless, there had been some interest within

the U.S. Steel Corporation in buying the T.C.I. and R.
Co., at least at a lower echelon.

James Gayley, vice-

president of the U.S. Steel Corporation, advised buying
the T.C.I. and R. Co. when it was selling at 50 dollars a
share, but this proposition was turned down due to the
opposition of Henry Prick, director of the U.S. Steel Corn

poration . r

No evidence, other than Gayley*s advice and

Morgan's relaying Kessler's offer to Gary, showed that
there was any interest or intention on the part of Morgan
or the U.S. Steel Corporation to buy the T.C.I. and R. Co.
To prove their contention that the Panic had been
aggravated by the Morgan interests, the Majority Report

^The New York Times, June 3, 1911, p. 3* The
Stanley Hearings^were v/*eIl~”covered by the New York papers,
particularly Tne New York Times.
^Ibid. , p. 1.
7
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quoted the testimony of Oakleigh Thorne, president of the
Trust Company of America and member of the Gates syndi
cate.

Thorne stated that a newspaper story which he at-

tributed to George Perkins had started a run on his bank.

o

Although Thorne’s statement was unequivocal, the evidence
which he offered to prove that Perkins made the statement
was the hearsay of another party who himself was only
making circumstantial assumptions.

9

Despite extensive

questioning of Perkins before the Stanley Committee,
particularly by its Chairman, neither Stanley nor other
members of the Committee asked Perkins about this charge.
The newspaper story to which Thorne referred out
lined the problems of the New York banks and mentioned
Thorne’s bank in particular; however, the substance of
the article was that arrangements had been made to provide
Thorne’s bank with sufficient cash reserves to weather the
Panic.^

Morgan was identified as the moving force in

providing this assistance.

Within a few hours after this

story was published on the morning of 23 October, a run
started on the Trust Company of America.

If Perkins made

the statement to the press about the assistance to the
Trust Company of America, the reaction certainly made it

^Ibid.» pp. 1660-64.
io

^Ibid.t p. 1700.

The New York Times, October 23, 1907, P* !•

3*7
seem maladroit.

On the other hand, nothing aside from

this purported statement was introduced to show that there
was any intent on the part of Morgan or his partners to
start a run on Thorne's bank.
Balanced against this statement about Perkins was
Thorne's testimony to the Stanley Committee concerning
Morgan.

Testifying to his great esteem for Morgan, Thorne

related that the financier personally loaned him 10,000,000
dollars to cover the run on his bank on 23 October and
arranged for the loan of an additional 1 5 ,000,000 dollars.*1*1
The main effort by the majority members of the
Stanley Committee to establish that an intent existed to
acquire the T.C.I. and E. Co. centered on the affairs of
Grant Schley and the banking and brokerage house which he
headed.

Schley, as the financial manager of the Gates

syndicate, undoubtedly could have provided the Stanley
Committee with the true aims of the Gates syndicate and
the reason for the apparent desire of the syndicate to
sell out even before the Panic of 1907.

The questioning

of Schley by the majority members of the Stanley Committee
was designed only to establish that the machinations of
the Morgan interests had brought about Schley's problems
in order to force him to sell the T.C.I. and R. Co.

11 S t a n l e y H e a r i n g s , p p . 1 6 6 4 , 1 6 6 6 .
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stock*

12

No allusions were made to the attempts of the

Gates syndicate to combine the southern iron and steel
companies, but the ownership of the T.C.I. and R. Co. by
the syndicate was treated as a major threat to the U.S.
Steel Corporation and ascribed as the motive for the ac13
quisition of the company. v Neither the majority nor the
minority members of the Committee made a serious attempt
to probe the motives of the syndicate members.

For ex

ample, when Gates appeared as the first witness before the
Committee, he was questioned about the intentions of the
syndicate.

He reminded the Chairman Stanley that he had

been called as a witness to answer questions about the
U.S. Steel Corporation, but not his own companies.14

No

further questions were asked along this line.
While the motives and intentions of the syndicate
remained undisclosed, its difficulties were brought to
light by the testimony of many witnesses, particularly
Schley.

In questioning Schley, majority members of the

Committee attempted to establish two incompatible facts:
that the Morgan interests or the U.S. Steel Corporation
had coerced him into selling a controlling interest in the
T.C.I. and R. Co. to the U.S. Steel Corporation, and that
1?

Stanley Report— Majority, pp. 176-77 and Stanley
Hearings, pp. l 0 9 U 7 3 0 ^ I 7 T T l J 7 “1114.
13
^Stanley Report— Majority, pp. 176-77*
14
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neither Schley nor the firm of Moore and Schley had con
trol of the T.C.I. and R. Co.'s common stock.

Exhaustive

questioning of Schley by the majority members of the
Committee failed to support either of these contentions,
while cross-examination by the minority members revealed
the desperate financial problems of the syndicate by the
fall of 1907.
As a witness, Schley was often contradictory and
unresponsive.

Nevertheless his testimony is valuable

since in the main other witnesses amplified and corrobor
ated it.

This testimony showed the syndicate members,

not as men of almost unlimited financial means, as the
Majority Report said, but as financially embarrassed stock
market manipulators, with Schley as their harassed agent. 15
^
Leonard Hanna, one of the principal members of the
Gates syndicate, described how the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock
had been manipulated.

The syndicate had moved into the

market when the stock was selling for 50 dollars a share,
bid it up to 130 dollars a share, and pegged it at ap
proximately this value.

The stock did not follow the

general decline of security prices in 1907.

Hanna ex

plained this by calling it an uncurrent stock.

Elaborat

ing on the term, he testified that it was closely held and

■^Stanley Hearings, pp. 1110, 1126: Absorption by
the United btates Steel Corporation, p. 10 3 •

that there were few stock market transactions in it. 1 6

He

also noted that it was overvalued since it only paid a
four per cent dividend and that there was absolutely no
market for it. 171
Exactly how closely the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock
was held cannot be determined from the testimony.
one thing is certain.

However

Schley as manager of the syndicate

held enough common stock to constitute a controlling interest.

1 Pi

The stock did not lay idle; syndicate members

used it as collateral to borrow money from Schley who, in
turn, used the same collateral to borrow money from banks
19
and other sources. y Since the demands of Schley’s
creditors that he substitute a more current

collateral

than the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock was the crux of his
problem,

20

both the Senate Committee and the Stanley Com

mittee tried to determine at what value Schley's credit
ors had accepted the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock as collateral
Schley evaded a direct answer, but said that he calcu
lated that about 50 per cent was all that he could

^ Stanley Hearings, pp. 862, 863, 867.
^Stanley Report-— Minority, p. 5^.
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•^Stanley Hearings, pp. 1095, 1096.
■^Absorption by the United States Steel Corporation, pp. 81-91
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Using Hanna's figure for the sale price of

the stock, this means that it was worth no more than 65
dollars as security to the banks.
this figure out.

Other evidence bears

Both Gary and Thorne testified they had

loaned money on the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock at 60 dollars
per share and in the absence of market transactions this
is the best evidence of the probable market value of the
stock. 22 But even this value was threatened because
Schley could neither substitute a more creditable asset
for the T.C.I. and B. Co. stock nor extend his maturing
loans backed by this stock. 23
^ His predicament was furpZi
ther complicated since many of his debts were call loans, "
subject to call if the collateral that backed them de
creased in value.

Thus if he defaulted on any of his

loans the stock would have fallen into the hands of his
creditors who undoubtedly would have offered it for sale
causing an immediate drop in the price.

In turn this

21Ibid., p. 1054.
22

Stanley Hearings, pp. 1090-91; Absorption by the
United Stat¥sBteel Corporation, p. 50; TEe^ITewTork'
Times, June 2, 1911, p* ^21 ”
^^The Commercial and Financial Chronicle,
August 1 2 ,
— —
—
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would have resulted in more pressure from his remaining
25
creditors to substitute a better collateral for his loans, v
Gary's loan on the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock was to
Schley and the circumstances leading to this loan were a
continuation of the story which began when Kessler told
Morgan that the T.C.I. and R. Co. was available for sale.
When testifying before the Stanley Committee Schley em
phasized more than any other point the constant demands of
his creditors that he substitute a more credible asset
than the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock as collateral for his
loans.^

He recalled that ". . • 7i000,000 dollars worth

of loans were called on us in three days” at the height
27
of the Panic by his insistent creditors. r Likewise he
told how he had relayed these demands and prior demands
to the members of the syndicate and of their inability to
28
assist because of the worsening business conditions.
Earlier in the fall, Oliver Payne, a former member of the
Gates syndicate, loaned Schley 8,000,000 dollars of cur
rent securities, taking uncurrent T.C.I, and R. Co. stocks
29
as collateral for the loan. ' Schley continued, recounting
that it was Payne who suggested to him that he sell the

25Ibid.
Stanley Hearings, pp. 1054-, 1126.
2?Ibid., p. IO5 4 .
29Ibid., pp. 1078, 1079, 1081.

28Ibid., p. 1110.
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T.C.I. and R. Co. stock to the U.S. Steel Corporation and
who offered the services of his lawyer, Lewis Cass Ledyard, to act as the intermediary with Morgan.

After

Ledyard had told Morgan of Schley's problems, the financier
asked Gary to buy the southern iron and steel company, 31
Gary refused to consider the sale, but on 23 October loaned
Schley 1,200,000 dollars, taking 2,000,000 dollars in
T.C.I. and R. Co. stock as collateral.^
Despite Gary's and Payne's loans, Schley could not
satisfy the increasing demands of his creditors.

Ledyard

again went to Morgan on 1 November to warn him of Schley’s
imminent bankruptcy.

The financier pressed Gary and

other company officials to buy the T.C.I. and R. Co. stock.
Still reluctant, Gary offered Schley a 3 or 6 million
dollar loan.

Schley said that it was insufficient.

Gary

then offered to buy the stock at 90 dollars per share.
Schley declined, saying that it was insufficient to satisfy
his creditors.

He countered with an offer to sell at a

figure slightly above the 100 dollar par value of the
stock.^

Gary accepted this figure and the terms of the
3°Ibid., pp. 1079, 1081.

31rbid., p. 36.

^ Ibid., pp. 65, 1090, 1091.
^ Stanley Report— Minority, p. 55*
^Stanley Hearings, p. 1123; The New York Times,
June 2, 1 9 l i r ’p: 3 7 ---^ Stanley Hearings, p. 1124.
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sale were as follows:

each share of T.C.I. and R. Co.

stock was to he exchanged for $119.04 of 5 per cent U.S.
Steel Corporation^

bonds that currently sold at 84 dol

lars, and the U.S. Steel Corporation publicly offered to
buy all of the outstanding T.C.I. and R. Co. common stock
at this figure. 37r Yet Schley testified that throughout
these negotiations Gary and Frick, who represented the
U.S. Steel Corporation, were reluctant about buying the
stock.
With the exception of 20,000 shares, the entire
issue of the stock was bought within a two week period by
39 «
the U.S. Steel Corporation. ' Schley testified that he
immediately used 12,000,000 dollars in bonds to repay some
of his loans, particularly stressing his loan from
40
Kessler.
When asked what effect this transaction had on
the financial community and his firm, he answered that it
immediately helped to restore confidence in the community
and make his firm solvent and that 11. . . within 35 days
Moore and Schley was impregnable.
Neither Schley's testimony nor the testimony of

^Stanley Report— -Majority, p. 187*
37
^'Stanley Hearings, p. 67*
^8Ibid., p. 1104.
^^Stanley Report^-Minority, p. 93.
^ Stanley Hearings, p. 1089.

^ Ibid. , p. 1095.
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other witnesses provided any substantive evidence that the
Morgan interest had aggravated the Panic to gain control
of the T.C.I. and R. Co.

Likewise nothing was introduced

to prove that U.S. Steel Corporation conspired or for that
matter intended to acquire the southern iron and steel
company.

If anything, the evidence showed Gary and Prick

opposed to the acquisition of the T.C.I. and R. Co. from
the beginning and only reluctantly agreeing to it at Mor
gan’s urgings to prevent Schley*s bankruptcy.

While Mor

gan *s motive in saving Schley at the height of the Panic
was understandable, questions remain about his motives and
intentions before this time.

Did he relay Kessler*s offer

to Gary in the spring of 1907 because he wanted to expand
the U.S. Steel Corporation or because he wanted Gates
eliminated from the steel industry as he i^anted him elim
inated from the railroad industry?

The failure to call

Morgan or Kessler as witnesses will leave these questions
unanswered, perhaps forever.

Whatevei' Morgan*s intentions

were, the purchase of nearly the total issue of the com
mon stock indicates that more was sought than the elimina
tion of Gates and the control of the T.C.I. and R. Co.
since this end could have been accomplished merely by pur
chasing a majority of the stock.

The Commercial and

Pinancial Chronicle noted that the immediate sale of
250,000 shares of stock to the U.S. Steel Corporation in
dicated that this was the amount which actually had been

used as security for loans 42 and gives credence to Gary's
testimony that the only reason for the acquisition was to
prevent Schley's bankruptcy and>the consequent failure of
his f i r m . ^
On the other hand, evidence existed of the Gates
syndicate's intent to sell because the syndicate agreement
specifically authorized Schley to sell if it could be done
at a profit.

iLlL

The testimony also showed that the only

known overtures to sell were made to Gary and Morgan.

To

Gary these overtures were made by persons who he identi
fied as representatives of the syndicate, and he was not
asked to further identify them.

In Morgan's case the

overtures came from Kessler and Payne, both former mem
bers of the syndicate, and creditors of Schley.

With its

usual lack of thoroughness in questioning witnesses, the
Stanley Committee failed to probe why Morgan and Gary
were the only people contacted as prospective buyers.
The failure to produce evidence or attempt to pro
duce evidence that other potential buyers were considered,
aside from Morgan or the U.S. Steel Corporation, does
little to discredit a hypothetical supposition that Gates
42

Commercial and Financial Chronicle, November 9,
1907, p. 1179.
^ The New York Times, June 2, 1911, p* 3*
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attempted, to accomplish with the combination of the southern steel and iron companies the same predatory but
pi'ofitable financial operation that Jiad worked so well
with the railroads.
The details of the sale, the evidence of the
events leading up to it, and particularly Schley*s evidence
did not support the attempt of the majority members of the
Committee to buttress their charge of an illegal intent by
claiming that Gary deceived Roosevelt when he told him that
a majority of the T.C.I. and R. Co. was held by an im
portant financial firm threatened with bankruptcy.
In the first instance the Majority Report claimed
that no one had a majority of the stock in his possession
because it was locked up in the individual strong boxes
of the syndicate members, none of whom had a majority. ^
Under direct questioning Schley was asked how many shares
of the stock he had in his possession.
not remember.

He said he could

When asked if it was a controlling interest,

he said that it approximated a controlling interest and
when pressed for a more definite answer, he admitted that
Moore and Schley had pledged at least 150,000 shares as
4-6
collateral for loans.
Yet this figure did not account
for the 35>?000,000 he had borrowed on the T.C.I. and R.
4-6
^Stanley Report-~Majority, p. 180.
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^ S t a n l e y Hearings, pp. 1095, 1096.
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Co. stock. f

Another indication of Schley’s control is

the speed at which the transaction was completed.

After

Ledyard visited Morgan on 1 November, the terms of the
sale were agreed upon within three days except for Roose
velt* s acquiescence.

No evidence or testimony showed that

any other member of the syndicate or stockholder, aside
from Schley, was contacted to approve the sale or its
terms.
In the second instance, the claim of the Majority
Report that Gary deceived Roosevelt about the collapse of
an important New York firm was actually two contentions.
The first was that it was not the brokerage house of Moore
and Schley that was in danger of failing but only Grant
48
Schley, its senior partner.
Since Moore and Schley was
a partnex*ship, however, disassociating Schley's liability
from the firm in v/hich he was the senior partner would
49
have been difficult.
His testimony indicated that there
was no such disassociation.

Although he stated that Moore

and Schley owned not a single share of T.C.I. and R. Co.
stock, he was just as definite in telling the Committee
how the sale of this stock caused money to flow into his
"boxes" and that "within 35 days Moore and Schley was

47Ibid., p. 1049.
^ S t a n l e y Report-— Majority, p . 193*
^ T h e New York Times, November 23» 1917* P* H «
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impregnable.

SO

The second contention, that Gary was inaccurate
when he described it as an important firm, depended upon
the perspective of the people who were trying to stem the
Panic in 1907 and those who were investigating it in 1911
and 1912.

To Morgan and his associates who were trying

to contain the Panic, perhaps the failure of any concern
would have been important.

To the majority members of

the Stanley Committee Moore and Schley was only a brokerage firm.-51 And the narrative of the majority report
refers to ,!his [Schley’s] loans aggregating 38,000,000,”-^
which disagrees with Schley's direct and uncontested testi
mony in v/hich he identifies the loans as Moore and
55
Schley's. ^ One method of evaluating the relative judgment
of Morgan and the majority members of the Stanley Committee
is to note that Schley's or Moore and Schley's indebtedness
came within a half million dollars of being equal to the
total value of the physical assets of the T.C.I. and R.
Co. as listed in the iron and steel company's current
54
annual financial statement.
50

, p. 1089

51

Majority, p. 193

^ I b i d ., p. 192.

^ Stanley Hearings, p. 1088.

^Commercial and Financial Chronicle, May 18, 1907 1
p. 1179.
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The majority members of the Stanley Committee also
attempted to elicit testimony from individual members of
the syndicate that they had been coerced into selling
55
their s t o c k . O n l y Gates, while admitting that he sold
his stock, said that it was a forced sale.

He added that

if it had been put on the market it would have gotten a
higher price.

In direct contradiction both Hanna and

Schley testified that no market existed for the stock. 56
Immediately after the U.S. Steel Corporation offered to
buy the stock, it became unpegged and dropped to 101 dol57
lars per s h a r e . T h e discrepancy in Gates' statement
about the forced sale is that he did not have to sell the
stock unless it was under control of the syndicate mana
ger, Schley, and only then according to the syndicate
agreement, if it could be sold at a profit. 58 What stood
out in Gates' testimony was that although he said it was
a forced sale, under direct questioning by both majority
and minority members of the Committee he did not or could

^ Stanley Report— Minority, p. 64. The Report
quotes the evidence ojTlsEe members of the Gates syndi
cate. Stanley Hearings, pp. 10, 14 gives Gates' evidence.
^ S t anley Report— Minoxuty, p. 54; Wall Street
Journal, August 3 T ^ l 5 T l ~ P „ 5~"^Commercial and Financial Chronicle, November 9,

1907, p. 1T52.
"^Stanley Report-~Hiriority, p. 51; The New York
Times, Hay 28, 1911, p. 1;"Stanley Hearings, p. 14.

51
not name the person or agency who forced the sale*
Failing in this line of questioning to produce any
evidence of coercion, the majority members of the Stanley
Committee insisted that the U.S. Steel Corporation had
used the Panic to acquire an asset of great value.

Claim

ing that "The value of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Co.'s
stock is the crux of the whole controversy," the Majority
Report said that if the stock was only worth 35 or 40
millions to the U.S. Steel Corporation then it had no
motive in refusing to relieve the necessity of Schley with
out his surrender of the stock in this company.

On the

other hand, if the existence of this firm threatened the
supremacy of the U.S. Steel Corporation in the south and
if its vast holdings were worth more than the price paid,
the U.S. Steel Corporation was the beneficiary of Schley’s
predie ament.^
From this premise the Committee introduced evi
dence to demonstrate that the true value of the T.C.I. and
R. Co. was greatly in excess of its capitalization.

For

the present it will only be necessary to say that this
evidence was that the T.C.I. and R. possessed 700*000,000
to 1,000,000,000 tons of iron ore.

However, the Committee

did not fix the value of this ore and therefore did not
59Stanley Hearings, p. 14.
^
^
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attempt to solve the "crux” of the problem.

The purpose

of introducing the premise was not stated, but it is evi
dent that the Committee majority wished to demonstrate
that the illicit intentions of the U.S. Steel Corporation
had been consummated by acquiring a corporation possessing
huge mineral resources.
What is significant about the Committee's unan
swered speculation about the true value of the stock is
that later writers have concentrated on the advantageous
price paid for the stock by the U.S. Steel Corporation.
But the Majority Report made no allegation that the price
paid for the stock itself was low, since it had gone to
great lengths to explain that it was pegged artificially
61
high to keep it out of the hands of speculators.
The conclusion of the section in the Majority
Report dealing with the purchase of the T.C.I. and R. Go.
bore down heavily on one contention:

that the U.S. Steel

Corporation could have avoided the absorption of the
T.C.I. and R. Co. by loaning Schley 6 million dollars.

62

But the Report failed to note that both Schley's and
Cary's evidence showed that Schley refused a loan for this
exact amount from Cary.

This statement, like the allega

tion that there had been an intent to violate the Sherman
Anti-trust Act,; is contradicted or not supported by the

61Ibid., p. 190.

62Ibid.. p. 194.
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available evidence.

The singular gap in the testimony,

the failure to call Morgan as a witness, must be borne by
the majority members of the Stanley Committee.

Likewise

the charge that Roosevelt had been duped by Gary rests
more on what is meant by the semantics of phrases like
“control of a majority of the stock" or "important New
York firm" than on the evidence produced.

The rational

ization that produced these charges is typified by the
claim in the Majority Report that "If the Steel Corpora
tion could have absorbed the Tennessee Coal and Iron . . .
without violation of the existing law it would not have
been necessary for Judge Gary, on a special car, rigged
up at midnight, to make that hurried run to Washington or
63
to confer with the President before breakfast. ” **

65Ibid., p. 208.

CHAPTER IV
THE T.C.I. AND R. CO. ACQUISITION FROM
AN ECONOMIC STANDPOINT
Although the intent and conspiracy charges appear
to be without foundation, there remained the contention
that the U.S. Steel Corporation's purchase of the T.C.I.
and R. Co. had created a combination that was in violation
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act by economic standards alone.
This was a difficult undertaking since the Act contained
no such standards.

The most practical approach to this

problem was taken by the Stanley Committee v/hich recom
mended that the Act be rewritten to specify that control
of a given percentage of the market would be evidence that
restraint of trade existed.

But even this definition

would have been ex post facto to the events surrounding
the merger of 1907 The nature of the complaints against the merger
were that the U.S. Steel Corporation had by the acquisi
tion of the T.C.I. and R. Co. enhanced its already pre
dominant control of the nation's iron ore resources, and
that the absorption of this company eliminated a competi
tor whose natural advantages in the production of pig iron
and open-hearth steel threatened the markets and capital
54

55
investments of the U.S. Steel Corporation*
The Majority Report of the Stanley Committee and
the Justice Department's suit claimed that the U.S. Steel
Corporation exercised a monopoly control over the iron ore
supply of the United States.

To support this claim, the

Stanley Committee Majority Report relied on the Bureau of
Corporations Report on the Steel Industry which, it said,
had condemned the corporation for this monopoly.^

This,

of course, was not quite true because the Bureau of Corpor
ations in its report had said that the corporation was not
a monopoly, although it had hedged this statement by saying
that it showed monopolistic tendencies in regard to iron
ore.

Specifically, the Bureau of Corporations Report said

that the U.S. Steel Corporation acquired ore lands in ad2
vance of needs and that its rate of profit on its ore
railroads, which also hauled other companies' ore, was
excessively high.^

The Department of Justice's suit con

tended that the U.S. Steel Corporation had greatly
strengthened its control of the iron ore of the country
by the acquisition of the T.C.I. and R. Co.
stated that it had

Further, it

. . b y the locking up of raw

p
Bureau of1 Corporations Report, Part I, p. 381
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^Ibidc , p. 374-*

^The Hew York Times, October 27, 1911, p. 2.
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materials . . ." prevented, their use by competitors.
Actiially the Bureau of Corporations Report, which ante
dated the suit of the Department of Justice and the Stanley
Report, produced the headline catching statistic that the
U.S. Steel Corporation controlled 75 per cent of the iron
ore resources in the Great Lakes area.
The impact of this figure on the reading public of
the time is hard to judge.

What is certain is that people

like Bryan and the majority members of the Stanley Commit
tee, who were attempting to lead public opinion were saying
that the federal government should prevent any single in
dustrial combination from owning or controlling more than
a specified percentage of an industry. Bryan proposed a
7
figure of 50 per cent in 1906.
The Majority Report of
the Stanley Committee set the figure at 30 per cent in
o
1912.
While Bryan's proposal was a simple statement, un
cluttered with details that might impede quick acceptance,
the legislative recommendation of the Stanley Committee
v/as necessarily more precise and therefore perhaps less
easily understood.

It recommended that if a corporation

or association was charged i^ith restraint of trade,
^Ibid.
6

Bureau of Corporations Report, Part I, p. 380.

^The New York Times, September 16, 1906, p. 1.
^Stanley Report— Majority, p . 214.
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presumption of unreasonable restraint should exist if the
organization controlled more than 30 per cent of the total
quantity of an article sold in the United States or in
9
any part of the country.
Clearly, as with the Sherman
Act, the Stanley Committee would leave the determination
of what was a monopoly to the courts.

It is also clear

that what the Bureau of Corporations Report was talking
about was total resources when it used a figure of 75 per
cent, whereas the Stanley Committee was talking about con
trolling the amount sold.

Since the U.S. Steel Corpora

tion was not a seller of iron ore and was dependent on in
dependent sources for pig i r o n , ^ very little judicial
interpretation would have been needed to place the U.S.
Steel Corporation's purported monopoly or monopolistic
tendencies beyond the pale of the Stanley Committee's 30
per cent limitation.

However, the courts were not con

fronted with this particular problem since Congress never
acted on the report's recommendation.
For unaccountable reasons the Bureau of Corpora
tions did not evaluate the effect of the T.C.I. and R.
acquisition on the ore position of the U.S. Steel Corpora
tion.

This may be accounted for by the statement in the

Report that the iron and steel industry of the United

^Ibid., p. 214.
^Stanley Report— -Minority, p. 92; Bureau of
Corporations
eel Investigation, File Numbe'r~™?6l2™i-4 ~2,
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States is based on the Lake District ore deposits. 11

This

rationale is somewhat supported by the cursory treatment
that the T.C.I. and R. Co. and the Birmingham district
received.
A questionable aspect of the Majority Report of
the Stanley Committee, the Bureau of Corporations Report
and the Justice Department's brief in the Steel suit is
the unexplained failure to use the U.S. Geological Survey's
figures where available to determine total ore deposits and
ownership of these deposits.

Instead, the figures of an

array of state tax commissions, company mining engineers,
and mining engineers whose credentials were not identified
were applied to both the Lake District and Birmingham
District without a standard criteria of assay value being
mentioned.

Working with evidence presented to the Stanley

Committee, and perhaps in an attempt to find what might
have been a non-controversial answer, the minority members
of the Stanley Committee took the high figures for the
total ore possessed or leased by the U.S. Steel Corpora
tion in the Lake District and the low figures for the total
12
resources of the same district.
The Majority Report's
use of figures from the financial pages of New York papers
to estimate the total ore reserves of the T.C.I. and R. Co.

■^Bureau of Corporations Report, Part I, p. 378,
12oj

1 ___ -o

.x. -Minority, p. SO.
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predictably produced greater resources than any other
source. ^

This probably resulted from the rash of arti

cles dealing with the T.C.I. and R. Co. that were pub
lished when Gates was attempting to put together his
14
southern combination.
If the figures of the Geological Survey and the
engineers of the Geological Survey are used to portray the
U.S. Steel Corporation's control of the ore resources in
the Lake District and the Birmingham District, there is a
significant difference in the percentage under the corpora
tion's control.
Survey's figures.

However, there is a gap in the Geological
They do not show the ore resources owned

or leased in the Lake District by the various corporations.
Therefore the Bureau of Corporations used the figures pro
vided by the companies themselves and these figures were
not challenged by the Stanley Committee or by the Depart
ment of Justice.

Since these represent the highest esti

mate given of the Corporation's resources in the Lake
District, their use to recompute the percentage of control
will eliminate any suggestion that the reevaluation is
biased in favor of the U.S. Steel Corporation.

The use of

any other figures for the U.S. Steel Corporation’s hold
ings in the Lake District will decrease its percentage of
13
■'Stanley Report— Majority, pp. 196-98.
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■^Commercial and Financial Chronicle, July 3.1, 1906,
p. 42; July 21, l y O b T p . 162; Wall Street Journal, May 10,
1907, p. 7.
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TABLE I15
PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OE
LEASED BY THE U.S. STEEL
AND LAKE DISTRICTS AFTER
AND

IRON ORE RESOURCES OWNED AND
CORPORATION IN THE BIRMINGHAM
THE ACQUISITION OF THE T.C.I.
R. CO.

Total Reserves
of District
Tons
Lake
District
Birmingham
District

Total

Ore Owned or
Leased by
U.S. Steel
Corporation

Per cent
Control by
U.S. Steel
Corporation

Toni

3 ,5 0 0 ,000,000

1 ,5 0 0 ,000,000

358,000,000

131,000,000

37%

3,858,000,000

1,631,000,000

43%

^Bureau of Corporations Reports Part I, p. 380;
Stanley Repor^-Flinority, p. 7 6 . ^e' Geological Survey
figures and the UTS. Steel Corporation figures for the
Lake District are in the Bureau of Corporations Report.
The Geological Survey figures for T.C.I. and R. Co. and
the U.S. Steel Corporation in the Birmingham District are
cited in the Stanley Report.

control.
Using the Geological Survey figures, the Corpora
tion's percentage of control is considerably lower than the
spectacular 75 per cent figiire given in the Bureau of Cor
porations Report (See Table I).

If the extent of monopoly

was to be determined by a percentage figure as recommended
by the Stanley Committee Report, the acquisition of the
Birmingham District ores by the U.S. Steel Corporation did
nothing to enhance the Corporation's monopoly position.
The allegation in the Department of Justice's suit that the
Corporation had locked up the nation's ore resources can be
questioned on other grounds.
Although the statistics used by the Bureau of
Corporations to determine ore resources were not derived
from consistent sources and were also fragmentary in places,
the statistics regarding production were systematically
gathered and present a coherent picture of the U.S. Steel
Corporation's relative position in the iron and steel in
dustry.

In the years from 1901 through 1909 the annual

average iron ore production of the Corporation was 45 per
*1

cent of the national figure.

The high figure in this

average was 46.3 per cent in 1908 and the low, 43 per cent,
17
occurred in 1903.
The coincidence between the production
percentage and ore control percentage of the U.S. Steel
16 Bureau of Corporations Report, Part I, p. 366.
1h b id.
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Corporation when using the Geological Survey's figures for
total resources did not indicate that Corporation was
locking up its resources.
On the other hand, the U.S. Steel Corporation
claimed that its resources were being used faster than any
other steel corporation.

Edwin Eckels, the Corporation's

Chief Mining Engineer, writing in 1912, claimed that at
i
the previously experienced annual rate of usage, the Cor
poration's ore deposits would be exhausted in 55 years.
In the same tabulation he indicated that the ore resources
1o
of the Bethlehem Steel Company would last for 785 years.
The Minority Report of the Stanley Committee made the same
claim, noting that the Corporation's acquisition of raw
materials had not kept pace with its expanding steel pro
duction.

It also said that the Corporation's ore supply,

at the present rate of production, would not last for
19
forty years.
Without going into the subject further,
the Bureau of Corporations Report said that it was appar
ently the policy of the Corporation to secure ore resources
20
we11 advance of requirements.
A factor which undoubtedly
promoted an aggressive policy in acquiring ore lands was

^ E d w i n C. Eckels, "Iron Ore Reserves," The
Engineering Magazine, Vol. 43 (August 1912), pp.~”4"71“73.
^Stanley Report--Minority, p. 92.
20 Bureau of Corporations Report, Part I, p. 381.
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the contemporary concern that the rapid expansion of the
steel industry would exhaust domestic iron ore resources
by the 1950's.*^
What stands out in regard to the controversy over
the acquisition of the T.C.I. and R. Co. and its ore re
sources is that when percentage figures were quoted in re
gard to monopolistic control by the U.S. Steel Corporation,
only the Lake District and the Birmingham District were
considered.

No attempt was made to compare the ore hold

ings of the U.S. Steel Corporation against the total re
sources of the country.

Let us assume that Roosevelt,

prior to “not interposing any objections” to the acquisi
tion of the T.C.I. and R. Co., had asked the U.S. Geolog
ical Survey engineers to give an opinion as to what degree
this acquisition would increase the U.S. Steel Corpora
t i o n ^ percentage of the total national resources.

The

U.S. Geological Survey would have given the President the
information that was subsequently included in government
22
reports
and the testimony that was given to the Stanley
Committee. 25
^ Then the following would have been given to

^ The Stanley Hearings, pp. 24-90-92; The Stanley
Report— -Minority, p. 92; U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of
^fclieSational Resources Commission, S. Doc. 676, V o l T ^ T H y
sss., p. 5 2 0 .
U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of the National
Resources Commission, S. Doc. 676, Vol. ITl, 653th Cong. ,
2T^eis7TTn5SD7“
25
■'Stanley Report— -Minority,-.p.- 76.
n m mm iTTr«i in
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the President: (See Table II)

TABLE II
PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OP THE U.S. STEEL CORPORATION'S
CONTROL OP TOTAL U.S. IRON ORE RESOURCES BEPORE
AND APTER THE ACQUISITION OP THE
T.C.I. AND R. CO.

Total U.S. Iron Ore Resources

4,788,000,000 tons

Per cent of U.S.
Resources Con
trolled by U.S.
Steel Corpora
tion
Total Owned, or Leased
by U.S. Steel Cor
poration Prior to Ac
quisition of T.C.I.
and R. Co.

1,500,000,000 tons

Ore Resources gained
by U.S. Steel Cor
poration by Acquisi
tion of T.C.I. and R.
Co.

131,000,000 tons

Total

1,631,000,000 tons

32%

34%
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A basic contention of the Stanley Committee Major
ity Report was that Roosevelt never considered the extent
of the raw material holdings of the T.C.I. and R. and the
effects of these holdings upon the steel industry.

It is

quite probable that he did not consider the ore holdings
of the T.C.I. and R. Co.

His testimony does not indicate

that he did, nor was he questioned by the Committee on
the matter.

But it is apparent that if he had consulted

the Geological Survey, he would have found the acquisition
of T.C.I. and R. Co. would have only added 2 per'cent to
the U.S. Steel Corporation's control of the total national
resources and, as noted in Table II, there was no increase
in percentage if only the country’s two main ore producing
areas, the Lake District and the Birmingham District were
taken together.

In any case the percentage of increase

did not exceed the 4- or 5 per cent that Roosevelt testi
fied that Gary had said would be the amount by which the
U.S. Steel Corporation's control of the steel industry
would be enhanced by the purchase of the T.C.I. and R.
„ 24Co.
The concern about the relative and absolute size
of the U.S. Steel Corporation by the Bureau of Corpora
tions, the Stanley Committee, and the Justice Department
was perhaps representative of a large segment of public
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opinion that believed that trust problems could be solved
by simply redefining monopoly in terms of the percentage of
the market or resources that a corporation held.

The mere

size of the U.S. Steel Corporation seemed to hypnotize the
people who were investigating it.

The Bureau of Corpora

tions Report, v/hich was published in July, 1911, said that
one of the monopolistic aspects of the Corporation was the
previously mentioned high rate of return on capital in
vested in the ore railroads, which, through high freight
rates for hauling ore could prevent new competition or drive
established competition out.

When Gates was testifying be

fore the Stanley Committee in May of the same year, the
Chairman reminded Gates of the coercive pov/er that the U.S.
Steel Corporation could exercise over his iron and steel
interests because of its possession of the ore railroads.
But Gates explained to Congressman Stanley that the Cor
poration could exercise no such coercive power as long as
25
the Interstate Commerce Commission did its job.
The main weakness in the charge that the U.S. Steel
Corporation held a monopoly or tended to monopolistic con
trol of the iron ore resources is that it failed to demon
strate the effects of monopoly.

That is that a monopolis

tic price structure existed or that competition was stif
led.

On the contrary, the Bureau of Corporations Report

said that competition had thrived despite the predominant
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pr
position of the corporation in the iron ore resources,
Moving up the ladder of production, the next
charge against the U.S. Steel Corporation was that its
motive for absorbing the T.C.I. and R. Co, was to gain a
cheap source of pig iron and prevent this source from competing with its more expensive product. 27r Although neither
the Department of Justice*s suit or the Bureau of Corpora
tions Report made this point, the Majority Report of the
Stanley Committee pressed it in great detail.

The sub

stance of the argument was that the closeness of the sup28
posedly cheaper non-Bessemer ores
to the coal fields in
the Birmingham District gave this area a distinct cost ad
vantage over other parts of the country in the production
of pig iron and therefore in the production of open-hearth
29
steel which could be made from non-Bessemer ores.
The
Majority Report of the Stanley Committee offered no data
or evidence to support its statement that the non-Bessemer
ores of the Birmingham District v/ere cheaper than the ores
of the Lake District.

An analysis of ore costs in the

Bureau of Corporations Report shows a different picture.
Averaging the at-the-mine costs of ore for the years 19021906, it lists the cost of Birmingham District ore at 73

^ B u r e a u of Corporations Report, Part I, p. 377*
^ S t a n l e y Report— Majority, pp. 159-166.
^ Ib id . ,

p.

160.

^ Ib id . ,

pp.

163>

167*

cents per ton and Lake District ore at r/8 cents per ton.

50

Since the iron content of the Lake District ore was ap
proximately 15 per cent greater than the Birmingham
51
District ore,
the cost differential was actually in favor
of the northern ores.
On the surface it would have seemed that the close
ness of the iron and coal deposits in the Birmingham Dis
trict would have given this area a distinct advantage over
other pig iron manufacturing sections of the country.

De

spite the numerous witnesses that the Majority Report cited
to prove the relative advantage of the Birmingham District
in producing pig iron, only Gates expressed the comparative
52
advantage in dollars and cents.
He told the Committee
that the cost of manufacturing pig iron in the Birmingham
District was 9 dollars a ton, hut that anywhere else in the
55
country it would cost at least 11 dollars a ton.
Gates'
estimate of the cost of making pig iron outside of the
Birmingham District was approximately confirmed by the
Bureau of Corporations Report's average of $11*82 per ton
54for pig iron made from Lake ores.
Howevei4, the cost data
^ Bureau of Corporations Report, Part III, pp. 50>51.
^Vance, Human Geography, p. $02.
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for pig iron manufacture in the books of the T.C.I. and R.
Co. showed the average cost to this company as $11.02 per
ton.^

James Bacon, President of the T.C.I. and R. Co.

until its takeover by the Gates syndicate, estimated the
company’s pig iron production cost at between 10 and 11
36
dollars a ton.
Prom the evidence so far introduced, it appears
that the T.C.I. and R. Co. had a definite advantage in the
manufacture of pig iron, and that the only question that
could be asked is how great the advantage was.

As recently

as 1969, Melvin Urofsky, in discussing the motives behind
the U.S. Steel Corporation’s acquisition of the T.C.I. and
R. Co., noted the approximately 2 dollar differential be
tween the Birmingham District and other iron manufacturing
Districts cited in the Stanley Report as a reason for the
purchase of the T.C.I. and R. Co. 37 However, this advan
tage quickly disappears when all the evidence given to the
Stanley Committee is considered.
Leonard Hanna told the Committee that there was
scarcely any market in the south for the company's pig
^ Stanley Report— Minority, p. 48.
^ I b i d . ^ p.

4.3#

37Melvin I. Urofsky, Big S t eeland the Wilson
Administration (Columbus, Ohio: (TKTo^Btate^TTniversity
tress, 1 9 6 9 ) , 2 2 .
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iron*

38

John Topping, President of the T.C.I* and P. Co.

at the time it was purchased by the U.S. Steel Corporation,
said that 75

cent of the company’s pig iron had to be
sold in northern markets.^39 Schley stated that Gates and

Hanna did not consider T.C.I. and R. Co. a true competitor
of northern companies since freight rates as high as $4.60
40
would keep it out of these markets.
Unfortunately none
of the agencies that investigated the steel industry
analyzed the effect of freight rates on the extent of the
market.

Nor, aside from one year, 1907, are there any

figures on the prices that the T.C.I. and R. Co« received
for its pig iron.
41
$16.49 per ton.

In that year the average price was
Nevertheless, some idea of the problems

of marketing southern pig iron in the northern markets are
apparent from the monthly price quotations published in
The Iron Age, the principal trade Journal of the iron and
steel industry.

If the freight rate of $4.60 per ton

specified by Schley for moving Birmingham District pig iron
to the north is added to the T.C.I. and R. Co.'s cost for
producing one ton of pig iron, $11.02, the combined cost
was $15-62.

Logically, then, Birmingham District pig iron

38
^
^ Stanley Report— Minority, p. 49w . urii i r . .* iai- inr -■■■ i. n r » n f

40

imwu n i iii

liiii mi..... m m* ■<n—n »iw ii i- iV n i "

Senate Investigation, p. 48.

^ Stanley Report— Minority, p. 49.

39 Ibid.
tn H B w n r n M
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could have only moved profitably into the northern market
when the price of pig iron exceeded $15*62 in northern
markets.

Using the monthly average figures for the 60

months comprising the years 1905-1909, there were 51 months
42
in which the northern market price exceeded $15.62,
or
stated another way, the T.C.I. and R. Co. could have only
sold pig iron in the northern market 51 per cent of the
time during this 60 month period at a price above produc
tion and transportation costs.

But these were prosperous

times for the iron and steel industry*

The pig iron prices

were higher than they had been since the 18801s ^ or would
/}h
be again until the late months of 1916.
In each of the
years from the beginning of 1905 until the end of 1908,
there were months in which the prices were high enough to
promote a northward flow of pig iron.

There v/ere less

favorable years.
In 1904 there was only one month in which the price
was above $15.64 per ton and in 1911 the price never rose
above $13*75*

These figures indicate that the T.C.I. and R.

42
"Iron and Steel Prices for Twenty-One Years," The
Iron Age, January, 1920, Vol. 105, p. 52.
^ F r a n k A. Pearson and George F. Warren, Prices
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1935), p. 3/l*
^ " I r o n and Steel Prices for Twenty-One Years," The
Iron Age, January, 1920, Vol. 105, p. 52.

Co.*s pig iron could only compete outside the southern
region when prices were above average and from this stand
point, the possession of this company would confer none of
the advantages of monopoly, at least not on national scale
If a monopoly in pig iron existed in the South merely by
the possession of this company, then it must have existed
prior to the purchase of the T.C.I. and R. Co. by the U.S.
Steel Corporation.

But this was not suggested by either

the Bureau of Corporations Report or the Majority or Minor
ity sections of the Stanley Report.

Likewise, no evidence

was produced to show that the U.S. Steel Corporation was
engaged in monopolistic practices in the South.

Perhaps

Gates, a witness who was certainly not friendly to the
U.S. Steel Corporation, provided the best evidence to
refute the allegation that the Corporation had used its
power to enforce monopolistic conditions.

When asked how

the U.S. Steel Corporation*s monopolistic control in the
South affected his company, he denied that it existed,
pointing out that his company, the Republic Steel Company,
45
sold 50 per cent of the ore it mined to other companies.
To a similar question regarding pig iron, he replied that
he had no problem competing with the T.C.I. and R. Co.
When Stanley attempted to draw Gates out on the threats
that the U.S. Steel Corporation had used, Gates replied
45
^Stanley Hearings, p. 53*

45

Ibid., p. 19*
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that nobody in the U.S. Steel Corporation would make such
threats and that if they did, nobody would believe t hem.^
Moving up from pig iron to the highest stage of
manufacture, open-hearth steel, the final allegation was
that U.S. Steel Corporation had absorbed a competitor that
threatened its position as the nation’s largest steel pro
ducer.

The substance of this claim was that the T.C.I.

and R. Co.'s manufacture of open-hearth steel with nonBessemer ores would break, as the Majority Report of the
Stanley Committee phrased it, "the perfect and hitherto
seemingly invincible control of steel products” by the
48
U.S. Steel Corporation.
The Department of Justice in
>

its brief said that the Corporation had shown a desire to
acquire a company that had recently assumed a position of
49
great significance.
On the other hand, the Bureau of
Corporations Report, while discussing the technical and
economic reasons for the rise of open-hearth steel pro
duction in all the steel producing areas of the country,
did not attach any particular advantage to this develop
ment in the South, nor comment on a relationship between
this development and the acquisition of the T.C.I. and R.

^ Ibid., p. 54-.
48

Stanley Report— Majority, pp. 160-161.

^ R e w York Times, October 27, 1911* P* 1*
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The sweeping language of the Stanley Committee
Majority Report was based on that assumption that the
T.C.I. and S. Co. had made a technical breakthrough that
enabled it to produce a steel that was cheaper or of a bet
ter quality than the product of the U.S. Steel Corpora51
tion.
Therefore, since the U.S. Steel Corporation only
possessed Bessemer ore and production facilities to convert
this type of ore into Bessemer steel, its huge capital in52
vestments were threatened by the T.C.I. and R. Co.
This
picture was pieced together in the Majority Report by the
omission of facts and a contrived patching of snatches of
evidence that was obviously intended to leave the reader
with the impression that the T.C.I. and R. Co. was already
a major producer of open-hearth steel while the U.S. Steel
Corporation was irrevocably committed to maintaining its
Bessemer supremacy.^55
The statistics of the Bureau of Corporations Report
show a completely contradictory picture.

The U.S. Steel

Corporation in the year of its founding, 1901, produced
2,747,000 tons of open-hearth steel or 99 per cent of the
Bureau of Corporations Report, Part III, pp. 304,
570, 373, 5 W :
^ S t a n l e y Report*— Majority, pp. 157-01.
g — r~r'~* f *—■
Til11" '■■—'

'

*

»
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nw

■

i

i

52Ibid., pp. 167, 169, 174-, 176.

55Ibid.
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national output.^

By 1906, the year before the acquisi

tion of the T.C.I. and R. Co., the Corporation's produc
tion had increased to 5?543,000 tons, but its share of the
56

total output had declined to 49 per cent. ^

In contrast to

this, the total steel output of the T.C.I. and R. Co. in
1907 was only 243,440 t o n s ^ which was only 2.1 per cent of
the national open-hearth production.

It is also noteworthy
that the T.C.I. and R. Co. was booked to capacity in 1907 57
and that the total expansion planned and advertised by the
Gates syndicate would have only raised the total'steel pro
duction capacity to 600,000 tons a year by 1 9 1 0 . ^

More

over, unskilled labor and inefficient management methods
caused the cost of steel manufacturing to be higher in the
59
Birmingham District than the northern d i s t r i c t s . I n
fact the T.C.I. and R. Co. sold 146,000 tons of steel rails
^ B u r e a u of Corporations Report, Part III, Table
5 0 , p. $60.
55Ibid. , p. 362.

56Ibid. . also Ta-bie 2 8 , p. 238.

^ Stanley Report— Majority, p. 173.
^®Wall Street Journal, April 2, 1907, p. 2.
^ S e e Bureau of Corporations Report, Part III,
p. 550 for comparative cost analysi"sT£~Tance, Human Geo
graphy, p. 305, cites the problem of unskilled labor in
Southern steel mills; Tarbell, Gary, p. 310, cites Gary's
demand that the T.C.I. and R. Co. terminate Its contract
for prison labor, quoting his repugnance to the customary
use of the whipping post as a means of supervision.
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in 1907 at a loss of 72 cents per t o n . ^
When the small steel production of the T.C.I. and
R. Co. and the limited plans for its expansion are con
trasted to the open-hearth production of the U.S. Steel
Corporation, it is difficult to see how the small company
could be a threatening competitor.

It is more difficult

when it is considered that when the T.C.I. and R. Co. was
purchased in 1907, the U.S. Steel Corporation was building
a steel plant at Gary, Indiana that would have an annual
open-hearth capacity of 3 ,750,000 tons or six times the
61
projected annual capacity of the T.C.I. and R. Co.
The
failure of the Majority Report of the Stanley Committee
to comment on internal expansion as extensive as this
while concentrating its attention on the acquisition of
such a small producer as the T.C.I. and R. Co. can only
lead to the conclusion that it was either misguided or
that the object of its investigation was something other
than the specter of monopoly.

The same can also be said

for the significance that the Department of Justice saw
in the absorption of the T.C.I. and R. Co.
As with the previous charges, what is striking
about the open-hearth monopoly allegation is the failure
60

Bureau of Corporations Report, Part III, Table
28, p. 239; Stanley Report— Minority," p. 49.
^ 11Gary: The Largest and Most Modern Steel Works
in Existence,” Scientific American, December, 1909, Vol.
1 0 1 , pp. 441-45.
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to show the effects of monopoly; to show that competitors
had been forced to leave the field or that a monopoly
price had been exacted.

The iron and steel price data in

the Minority Report of the Stanley Committee is computed
on a national basis,

merely reflecting the cyclic de

cline of iron and steel prices that began in the middle of
1907 and continued through 1912 when the Stanley Report
was published.

No explanation is given in the Minority

Report for the drop in prices after 1907*

The Bureau of

Corporations Report, touching on the matter of prices very
lightly, says that while the costs of production remained
remarkably stable, prices always fluctuated with market
conditions. v

At the bottom of the cyclic trough in prices

in 1911 when a ton of steel was ten dollars cheaper than
it was in 19075 "tke financial writers attributed the low
prices to the competition brought about by numerous pro64
ducers and expanded capacity.
In spite of this glut of
production, the U.S. Steel Corporation was forced to de
fend itself against the operations of pools by securing
65
options and buying pig iron from independent producers. ^
-Minority, pp. 84-90.
urea

r Corporations Report, Part III, p. 8.

Bureau of Corporations Steel Investigation. Pile
2612-4-2, RG 122.
^ T h e New York Times, November 14, 1910, p. 3*
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Nor is there any evidence that the Corporation was the
price leader.

On the contrary, the available accounts

of the price movements show that it followed the trend set
by the independents. 66 An exception to the statement that
prices folloi^ed market conditions is the fixed price of
steel rails which remained at 28 dollars per ton through
the years 1902-1912 according to the historical statistics
of the United States.^

It may be that this was a purely

coincidental average since it was not offered as evidence
of price fixing by either the Department of Justice's
brief or the agencies that investigated the steel industry
and the U.S. Steel Corporation.

However, the previously

cited sales price of rails for the T.C.I. and R. Co. in
1907 and a contract for future delivery of rails by the
same company at 30 dollars per ton indicate that there
were variations in price.

An interesting sidelight to

the price issue is that the leaders of the steel industry,
Gary, Carnegie, and Perkins, recommended in their

66

Bureau of Corporations, Steel Investigation,

Pile N u m b e F ^ ^ - I ' - T - ' 2 7 ' H ^ r 2 7 --------'-----

----

^Social Research Council, The Statistical History
of the United States from Colonial TTme^to~tIie present
X B ta E ro rH 7 **^ o ^ 5 e c trc u ^ T T !a 3 !i^Ie IH ~ IirD r£ s E e rs 7 ~ T n c 7 7 ~ T 9 ^5 ) »
Series E 101-112, p. 12368Stanley Report— Hajority, pp. 174-75.
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testimony to the Stanley Committee that the federal govern
ment control steel prices.

Carnegie even recommended that

the government determine the price of all goods sold in
interstate commerce. 69 Branding these suggestions as
socialistic, the Majority Report firmly rejected them as
70
unconstitutional.
No evidence was presented that the absorption of
the T.C.I. and R. Co.
field.

drove other competitors from the

The only complaint in the Bureau of Corporations’

files against the Corporation is a single stockholder's pro71
test that cash reserves had been invested in securities .'
Likewise the Department of Justice's suit was seriously
embarrassed when competitors who were called as government
witnesses, in fact, became witnesses for the defense.'72
Actually the issuance of the Stanley Report in
August, 1912, was an obituary notice for the acquisition
of the T.C.I. and R.

Co. as a public issue.

Although Bryan

attempted to revive it during the presidential campaign
that year, he was quite alone.
The question remains about how much the acquisi
tion of the T.C.I. and R. Co. increased the control of
^ S t a n l e y Hearings, pp. 234, 627, 1128.
^ Stanley Report-~Majority, p . 211.
71
f Bureau of Corporations, Steel Investigation,
Rile Number 1908-1-1-3,
72
( Donald Dewey, Monopoly in Economics and Law
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, i93*J77~P*'~^34.
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the U.So Steel Corporation over the iron and steel industry of the United States.

Aside from the multitude of

estimates on the iron ore resources of the U.S. Steel
Corporation and the T.C.I. and R. Co., none of the agen
cies v/hich investigated the steel industry and the Corpora
tion produced any evidence or statistics on the increase
in capacity that the U.S. Steel Corporation gained as a re
sult of its purchase of the southern company.

The Bureau

of Corporations Report came the nearest to an estimate of
this type when it shov;ed growth percentage comparison,
using 1901 as a base year and contrasting it with the
73
Corporation's capacity in January, 1911.
Although not
showing capacity changes in 1907, it notes that in the ten
year period the Corporation's plant capacity grevi 88 per
cent by internal expansion, but only 30 per cent by ac74
quisition of other companies . '
Since the capacity
figures are not available, the comparative production and
percentage figures for 1907 are the only alternative for
determining to what degree the acquisition increased the
U.S. Steel Corporation's control of the total production.
Actually in 1907, there was probably very little difference
between total production and capacity since, as previously
73
'^Bureau of Corporations Report, Part III, Table
29, p. 269.
^ Ib id .

81
mentioned, the iron and steel plants were booked to capa
city during the entire year.
Table III, which was taken from the Bureau of
Corporations Report, portrays and summarizes the relation
ship between the total production of the iron and steel
industry in 1907 and both the T.C.I. and R. Co. and the
75
U.S. Steel Corporation. ^ The figures for ingots and
castings, being steel in the unfinished condition, are the
76
best index of a steel producer's output . f
In sum, the
figures show that Gary's statement to Roosevelt regarding
the increase in percentage of control that would result
from the T.C.I. and R. Co. acquisition were well within
the 4- or 5 pei* cent figure that he stipulated.

Likewise

the figures show the relatively unimportant position the
T.C.I. and R, Co. held in the American steel industry and
the unlikelihood that the merging of this company with the
U.S. Steel Corporation would in itself create a monopoly.

75
'^Bureau of Corporations Report, Part III, Table
28, p. 238.
76Ibid., p. 369.
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CHAPTER V
THE SOURCE OP THE LEGEND
When attention is directed to the relatively small
size of the T.C.I. and R. Co. compared to the predominant
position of the U.S. Steel Corporation and the minor
effect the acquisition had on the larger concern's share
of the total national steel output and iron ore reserves,
the continued interest in the matter seems out of pro
portion to what the facts warrant.

This is because the

controversy was rooted in politics.
Even though the actual acquisition caused almost
no unfavorable comment, the political reactions that could
result from the understanding between Roosevelt and Gary
were a concern to the Administration.

When Gary drafted a

memorandum outlining the terms under which Roosevelt had
acquiesced in the merger, at Root's request Gary deleted
the favorable offhand remarks the President made regarding
the U.S. Steel Corporation.^
Likewise, there were political overtones in Gary's
omitting to tell Roosevelt the name of the important New
York concern that faced bankruptcy.

Although Schley's

^George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt:
1900-1912 (New York: Harper and BrotHF
, 1553),
p. 218.
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name or his firm’s name were not mentioned in the press
either in connection with Gates' efforts to combine the
Southern steel companies or the sale of the T.C.I. and R.
Co.5 during the 1894 debate on the sugar tariff in the
Senate

his firm had come under fire when it refused to

divulge the names of Senators who had accounts with it and
who were suspected of speculating in sugar company stocks. 2
Apparently, the issue had not been forgotten since it was
the only significant item of public interest mentioned in
Schley's obituary in 1917*^
A natural assumption is that Gary x/ithheld the name
because it woxild have been impolitic to have to testify at
a later date that the President had for any purpose know
ingly been a party to saving a firm which once had been
involved in a political scandal*

The probability that evi

dence or testimony might sometime be required must have
been anticipated or otherwise the memorandum of the conver
sation would not have been necessary.
The assumption regarding the name of the threatened
concern is reinforced by the failure of either of the Con
gressional investigating committees to ask Gary why he
failed to give the concern's name to the President.

Sig

nificantly, neither the majority nor minority members of

^The New York Times, November 2$, 191?, p* 11.
?Ibid.
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the Stanley Committee queried Roosevelt on this point
either.
Perhaps what most clearly indicates the political
nature of the controversy is the lapse of time between the
acquisition of the T.C.I. and R. Co. in 1907 and the
manner in which the controversy became a national politi
cal issue in the presidential campaign of 1908, resulting
in a demand for an investigation only in 1909.
Unhappily, the Democrats had been forced to watch
Roosevelt steal their fire and become the people's popular
champion against the trusts.

Without doubt Roosevelt's

popularity was an ingredient of the continued Republican
success at the polls and it was not unnatural for the
Democrats to look for a chink in the Trust Buster's armor.
The Senate Committee which investigated the ab
sorption of the T.C.I. and R. Co. completed its work in the
lame duck session of Congress which began in January and
ended in March, 1909.

Although it called few witnesses,

the tactics of the Committee's principal Democrat, Senator
Culberson,

in demanding that Roosevelt release information

not related to the absorption of the T.C.I. and R. Co. from
the partially completed Bureau of Corporations' investiga
tion of the steel industry and the President's refusal
provided the Committee with its only publicity and centered
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the attention of the investigation on Roosevelt.^
Although the charges that the Democratic members
made regarding the acquisition of the T.C.I. and R. Co.
were substantially the same as the much better publicized
Stanley Committee, the publication of these charges co
incided with the inauguration of a new Administration and
received little attention.

The Stanley Committee, on

the other hand, from the beginning received a fair share
of publicity.

Credit for this notoriety seems to belong

to Stanley who had a certain flair for showmanship.
Gates, whose manner of life and reputation assured news
paper coverage, was called as the first witness and when
he became irritated at being q*aeried by Stanley about the
intentions of the U.S. Steel Corporation, the Chairman
told him that he was only asked these questions because
g
he was the “primusn witness.
Nor did Stanley leave the
propagation of the Committee's activities to the transient
interest of the newspapers v/ho had Washington correspon
dents.

Each day the Committee heard witnesses, and 10,000

copies of the evidence were printed for distribution.

n

As with many other Congressional investigations,

^Outlook, January 16, 1909, Vol. 91, p* 88.
United States Corporation, p. 16,

^U.S., Congress, House, 62nd Cong., 1st sessM June
9, 1911, Congressional Record, pp. 1810, 1811, 1841, 1842.

8?
the purpose of the Stanley Committee was not simply to
study a change related to a legislative problem.

When

asked on the floor of the House if the Committee hearings
were some kind of a goad, Stanley described them as an
o
ancillary operation for the Department of Justice.
The bulk of the testimony concerned the acquisition
of the T.C.I. and R. Co.

While the purpose of the Commit

tee was to determine if the U.S. Steel Corporation or other
corporations had violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the
attention given to such matters as the founding of the
corporation in 1901 or the celebrated Gary dinners was
small in comparison to the detailed probing of the merger
of the two steel companies.
Stanley took upon himself the main questioning of
witnesses and set the tone of the investigation.

His

methods stamped him more as a demagogue than as a legis
lator attempting to use the evidence of witnesses to frame
more equitable laws.

This was evident in the many extrava

gant and unsubstantiated allegations which were introduced
as testimony during the hearings and later included in the
Majority Report as facts, although neither the whole testi
mony or cross-examination supported the allegations.
Perhaps the most glaring example of this was the
o
U.S., Congress, House, 62nd Cong., 1st sess.,
May 16, 1911, Congressional Record, p. 1231.
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inclusion of only part of Thorne's evidence to support the,
charge that the Morgan interests had aggravated the Panic.
Other examples were the charge that the U.S. Steel Corpora
tion had forced its competitors to shut down several of
their plants, a charge that was in no way substantiated by
9
any evidence.
Stanley's characterization of Gates as a
true competitor struggling against the monopolistic power
of the U.S. Steel Corporation^ is at odds with evidence
that Gates was attempting to monopolize the entire iron
and steel production of the Birmingham district.^1
Many of Stanley's statements could only have been
intended for the uninformed.

He falsely stated that the

Bureau of Corporations Report on the steel industry had
said that the U.S. Steel Corporation was a monopoly. 12
Likewise, he said that the Bureau of Corporations had been
15
investigating the same corporation since 1896, ^ although
the U.S. Steel Corporation did not come into existence
until 1901 and the Bureau of Corporations only in 190$. 14
Nevertheless, political considerations forced
Stanley and others who were criticizing the acquisition to
9
^Stanley Report— Majority, p. 161.

10 Ibid., p. 204.

^ Bureau of Corporations Report, Part I, p. 2$9.
•^Stanley Report— Majority, p. 204.

^ Ibid., p. 204.

■^"Act to Establish the Department of Commerce and
Labor, St atut e s at "han ge,
> ’B27~TT90 JJ.
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exercise a certain circumspection in their attacks.
Birmingham had, greeted the coming of U.S. Steel Corporation
15
in 1907 with great enthusiasm v and, while this event did
not make the city another Pittsburgh or Gary, not only were
the prospects pleasing but the years between the acquisi
tion and the time of the Stanley Committee investigation
had brought advantages and benefits.

Workers were paid

twice a month instead of once a month and the use of prison
1fi
labor was discontinued.
The most significant advantage was a change in the
marketing price structure which substituted the so-called
Birmingham differential for Pittsburgh Plus prices.

Prior

to the merger the T.C.I. and R. Co. had charged all cus
tomers the going price at Pittsburgh plus the freight charge
from Pittsburgh to the point of delivery.

Shortly after the

merger, the U.S. Steel Corporation enhanced the competi
tive position of the T.C.I. and R. Co. by abandoning Pitts
burgh plus in favor of charging a flat 3 dollars over the
Pittsburgh price to the point of delivery.

Without doubt,

this extended the market that Schley said was restricted

^Irmes, Coal and Iron, pp. 519-20.
-1 r

Bureau of Corporations Steel Investigation, File
2612-1-4-2, RG 122.
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by freight rates as high as $4.60 per ton.'*''7
Consequently, Stanley's attack on the merger did
not pass without challenge.

Richard Austin, a Tennessee

Congressman, pointed to the large sales that T.C.I. and R.
Co. had made in foreign countries as a result of the U.S.
Steel Corporation's world-wide marketing organization.
Then he noted that Oscar Underwood, the Chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, in whose district the
T.C.I. and R. Co. was located, had made no adverse comIS
ments on the merger.
Underwood's silence was more than passive as Stan
ley later learned.

When the Committee's work was done in

the summer of 1912 and its report published, Stanley wished
to discuss it on the floor of the House.

Underwood used

his position as the Ways and Means Committee Chairman to
19
block any discussion. ' An attack in the press on Under
wood's obstructive tactics allowed Stanley to defend his
fellow congressman from what he termed a misguided inter20
pretation of Underwood's actions.
On the following day,

■^George W. Stocking, Basing Point Pricing and
Regional Development: A Case Sfrildyo^
Steel
Tndiiitl^
1 • Unrvers'i’ty oT"TTortli Carolina Press,
lWTj, pp. 63-64, fn 1 (hereafter cited as Stocking,
IS

U.S. Congress, House, 62nd Cong., 1st sess.,
May 16, 1911 * Congressional Record, p. 1231.
19Ibid., August 3, 1912, pp. 1014-6, 10160.

20Ibid., August 7, 1912, p. 10306.
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the Stanley Report was debated on the floor of the House
and the discussion was closed without mention or allu
sion to the T.C.I. and R. Co. or the merger that occurred
in 1907.21
The lack of verbal pyrotechnics merely under
scored the fact that important Congressional interests
could not afford to be exposed to public interests, and it
is well worth noting that there were no derogatory remarks
about this merger on the floor of Congress except for
Senator Culberson’s remarks in 1909-

Likewise, it ac

counts for the reproduction of 10,000 copies daily of the
evidence given at the Stanley Hearings, since these copies
could be kept out of the automatic distribution channels
that the Congressional Record followed.

Above all, it ex

plains Bryan’s failure to name the company when he opened
the issue in the presidential campaign of 1908, when he
repeated it in 1912, and Wilson's failure to make the
material in the Stanley Report an issue in 1912 as the
22
press predicted he would.
Moreover, Roosevelt's willing
ness in 1908 to factually amplify on Bryan's obscure alle
gation probably stemmed from the same motive.
Contemporary press opinion of the Stanley Commit
tee was unfavorable.

Even before the Committee finished

21Ibid., August 8, 1912, pp. 10518-38.
22 Bureau of Cornorations Steel Investigation,
Pile 2612-1-4-2, RG’ 122".
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its work, the line that it- had taken on the Panic of 1907
received skeptical treatment,

A few weeks before the

publication of the Report, the Democratic New York Times
commented editorially ". . . Chairman Stanley wants some
thing to influence the election, since he would not pro24
ceed otherwise if he were not thinking of the election.'
The Report itself was even less favorably viewed.
Although the Minority Report of the Committee was free of
the clumsy political bias of the Majority Report, it did
not fail to make a partisan defense of Roosevelt's actions
in its closing paragraphs.

On the othex* hand, it was at

best a weak rebuttal of the charges in the Majority Report.
The press comment was caustic and spared neither side.
Editorially the New York Evening Mail called the Report
”. . . largely electioneering guesswork,”25
^ while the New
York Times said, ”. . .

the Stanley Committee provided a

political jest book which either side will hurl at the
26
other through the campaign.“
Summing up the reaction
of the nation's press, the Literary Digest noted that the
Report's publication was viewed as a political rather than
27
a legislative event.

^ Independent, August 17, 1911, Vol. 70, pp. 378-79.
^ T h e New York Times, July 17, 1912, p. 6.
25
-^Quoted in the Literary Digest, August 3, 1912,
Vol. -45, p. 178.
26Ibid.

27Ibid., p. 176.
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The prediction of The Nexf York Tribune, immediately
.prior to the publication of the Report, that it would set
forth the political lines of the Democratic and Republican
Parties in the forthcoming election, did not hold true.

OQ

No evidence can be found that any of the three major
candidates ever referred to it.

More important, the Demo-

cratic Party for which the Report would have served as a
source of ammunition had already moved away from the posi
tion which the Stanley Report made in its legislative
recommendations.
In 1912 the Democratic Party Platform made no men
tion of an arbitrary percentage of control that a corpora
tion could exercise in an industry.

The 1908 platform,

however, had specified the 50 per cent limitation which
Bryan used in his allegation against Roosevelt in the Presi
dential election of that year concerning the T.C.I. and R.
Co. merger. 29 The 30 per cent limitation recommended by
the Democratic majority in the Stanley Report was not in
. .
30
consonance with the party position.
Still the Stanley Committee cannot be dismissed as
having no effect on the events of its time or for that
28 Bureau of Corporations Steel Investigations, Pile

2612-l-4-271^n227'

-~—

29^National P arty Platforms, comp, by Kirk H. Porter
and Donald B r u c e T ’oEnsonX'^rbana, Illinois: University of
Illinois Press, 1966), p. 149.
^Ibid. , p. 169.

94matter on the course of history.

While the Committee was

in session, the Department of Justice filed its suit
against the U.S. Steel Corporation for violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the connection between the two
appears more than coincidental.
Like the Congressional investigations of the
T.C.I. and R. Co. acquisition, the equity suit against the
U.S. Steel Corporation was instituted some years after the
acts with which it was charged were committed, with the
exception of the Gary dinners.

Even the dinners, which
■31
began in November, 1907, ended in January, 1911i
five
months prior to opening of the Stanley Hearings and ten
months prior to the government’s institution of its suit.
Somewhat paradoxically, the filing of the suit
came only four months after the issuance of the Bureau of
Corporations Report on the Steel Industry which said that
the U.S. Steel Corporation was not a monopoly.
Viewed through the eyes of many contemporaries,
the government’s decision to prosecute the U.S. Steel
Corporation and its timing appeared only as an act of
political expediency.
The New York Press said, "It is impossible for the
Administration to escape the suspicion of political motives
since the effect of the suit is taking the wind out of the

31Stocking, Basing Point Pricing, p. 4-6.
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sails of the Democratic House by anticipating the report
52
of its Stanley Committee.
The Independent noted
”. . .

that much of the petition was suggested by the
22
Stanley Committee."
J. G. Butler, an independent iron
manufacturer and president of the Western Pig Iron Associa
tion, called the suit an outgrowth of the politically inspired Stanley investigation.
More substantive evidence of the dubious motives
of the suit revealed itself in the instructions from the
Department of Justice to its attorneys who were to examine
the IT.S. Steel Corporation officials to avoid questions
that would produce evidence regarding the total national
iron ore resources and the corporation's relative position
to the total resources.^

Previously this was pointed out

as a questionable aspect of both the Bureau of Corporations
Report and the Stanley Report; it is apparent the govern
ment pressed its case knowing that a major point on which
it charged the U.S. Steel Corporation with being a monopoly
in an economic sense contained a flaw which v/ould be best
concealed from judicial examination.

^'"Quoted in the Literary Digest, November 4, 1911 *
Vol. 43, p. 777.
^ Independent, November 2, Vol. 71* P- 123.
^ T h e New York Times, November 11, 1911, p. 755

Bureau of Corpoi'ations Steel Investigation, Pile

6518-8-10, R G T ^ Z T ™
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Regardless of whether the administration's motives
•in bringing the suit were political, the results were*
The charge that Gary duped Roosevelt and the ex-president's
quick defense of his actions and attack on Taft's anti
trust policies not only brought the long smoldering, semi
private conflict of the two into the open, but split the
Republican Party into pro-Taft and pro-Roosevelt factions*
Although Taft denied knowing that Roosevelt's name was to
be included in the government’s petition, 36 efforts at re
conciliation between them foundered on Roosevelt's unabated
rage at being named as the gullible victim of Gary’s
deceit.^
Without doubt, Roosevelt's implacability served his
own political ambitions well and Taft realized how we11
they served him*

On January 15* 1912, when the President's

military aide, Major Butt, who was on friendly terms with
Roosevelt, told Taft that the breach with the ex-president
was irreparable, the President grimly replied that he might
be defeated for re-election but that he would defeat

Archie Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, the Intimate
Letters of Archie Butt ,“l^Trtar^ATd^7^ ^ n IT'TGarden
UTty7~TCwra*ToHcT'TJ6uBIeday, I)oran and Company, Inc., 1950),
p. 813 (hereafter cited as Butt, Taft and R oosevelt);
Henry P. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft,
Vol. II (Hamden, ConnecT£cu35T‘^ ^ h B n ^ T C 6 ¥ s 7 ^ T 9 ^ 77
(hereafter cited as Pringle, Taft).
^Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, p. 811.
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Roosevelt in the Convention. 38
What little evidence there is points to George
Wickersham, the Attorney-General, as the person responsi
ble for the political ineptitude of bringing Roosevelt's
name into the suit.

Butt said that the ex-president v/as

named ". . . thanks to that marplot Wickersham.

Other

evidence of Wickersham's lack of political sophistication
exists.

Two days after the suit against the U.S. Steel

Corporation was filed, the Omaha World-Herald quoted its
Washington correspondent as saying that Mr. Wickersham
gave much of the credit for the suit to the Stanley Com
mittee.^
If Wickersham did give credit to the Stanley Com
mittee for inspiring the suit against the U.S. Steel Cor
poration or if the suit with its implied aspersion on
Roosevelt's gullibility was a reaction to the Stanley
Hearings, then Stanley must be given credit not only in
conducting successful ancillary operation for the Justice
Department but also indirectly bringing about the open
breach between Roosevelt and Taft and the consequent
Republican defeat in 1912.
In the controversy over the acquisition of the
T.C.I. and R. Co., a point generally overlooked was that

58Ibid. , p. 813.

?9Ibid., p. 811.

^Ornaha World-Herald, October 29, 1911, P- 1.
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Roosevelt's acquiescence to this merger set a precedent.
Prior to this time, neither business nor the government
discussed proposed mergers or the legality of mergers al
ready in existence in relation to the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act*

Consequently, considerable uncertainty always ex

isted about the legal status of a combination or a pro
posed merger.
Despite the published acquiescence of Roosevelt to
the merger of the two steel producers, there is no evi
dence of other companies attempting to preclude legal
action under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act by reconciling
their problems with the executive branch during the re
maining sixteen months of the Roosevelt Administration*
Under Taft such reconciliations were impossible, since he
believed that anyone could understand the anti-trust
statute and was impatient with those who said they could
41
not.
An almost immediate change took place under the
next Administration.

Although Wilson, like Roosevelt, had

been loud in his attacks on the trusts, his AttorneyGeneral, James NcReynolds, began negotiations with the New*
Haven Railroad and the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company which resulted in these companies agreeing to
surrender part of their recently acquired control of the
41

to

Pringle, Taft, p. 655 > quoting letter from Taft
H. L. HigginsonT^Beptember 8, 1911.
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control of the New England transportation system and the
national telephone network respectively in exchange for
the government1s dropping all charges against them under
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 42
At the same time, an attempt to legislate authorization for such agreements was voted down in Congress. 43^
However, the decision of the Supreme Court in the U.S.
Steel Corporation suit sanctioned Roosevelt’s action in
44
the T.C.I. and R. Co* merger.
When in 1925 the Depart
ment of Justice inaugurated the policy which is still in
effect of approving or disapproving of mergers before they
are consummated, 45 it caused no controversy indicating that
the question of the President’s propriety in doing this had
passed as a political i s s u e . ^
In retrospect, the controversy over the T.C.I. and
42
New York Times, December 20, 1913, p. 1; August
12, 1914, p. 9; October 18, 1914, Part III, p. 1.
^ J o h n D. Clark, The Federal Trust Policy (Balti
more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1*951), p7~T76 (Hereafter
cited as Clark, Trust P o l i c y ).

^ U n i t e d States v. United States Steel Corporation,
251 U.S. 446, 447 (1919).
^Clark, Trust Policy, p. 256; Earl V. Kintner, An
Antitrust Primer, A Guide to Antitrust and Trade_Re^Ri§;"'
tion Laws for ~lBusine~s¥mHn^rNevrHHrHT~iHeHHITmri 1 an

Uoipen^^T^S^rjT^p. X397

^Clark, Trust Policy, p. 256.
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R. Co. was in reality a partisan political issue of the
times rather than an event of significant and continuing
economic importance.

The preservation of the legend

merely illustrates the propensity of some writers and
historians to make the past serve the political causes
and passions of their own era.
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